“America First,” World Last? - The Rise of India and China in the Wake of Trumpism
September 29, 2025 Meetali Dhaka
Abstract
The post-World War II global order, championed by US-led multilateralism, is under growing strain amid the shifting power dynamics of the Trump era. While Donald Trump's 2016 presidency challenged global governance, his return in 2025 marked an even pronounced turn in American foreign policy, characterised by unilateralism, economic nationalism and isolationism, institutional disengagement, and intense trade wars under the “America First” doctrine. Deploying a case-study approach based on secondary literature, this paper reveals that non-Western powers like India and China are reshaping global governance by leveraging the leadership vacuum through divergent but complementary pathways. While China pursues aggressive retaliation and parallel institutional models, India balances Western integration with strategic autonomy, multi-alignment and South-South solidarity. These actions are not merely responses to US multilateral disengagement but highlight the potential future transformation of the contested and volatile contemporary world order.
Keywords: Trump, multilateral disengagement, China, India, strategic autonomy, multi-alignment
Introduction
The new world that emerged after World War II was characterised by global institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While built on the foundation of collective security and multilateral engagement for reconstructing the war-damaged world, they functioned as instruments of American hegemony and global leadership for decades (Beeson & Higgot, 2005).
However, with Trump’s return to the US presidency in 2025, US foreign policy took a sharp retreat from multilateralism that not only marked a disruption in the country’s traditional global hegemon role but also created a leadership gap in key arenas of global governance like health, climate change and humanitarian aid, forcing non-Western powers to reevaluate historical Western models. His return thus crystallises two critical questions: can a global order built on US leadership survive the withdrawal of its most powerful member? If yes, who can potentially fill the gap and how? Therefore, this paper examines how China and India are recalibrating their engagement with global institutions differently and what implications this might have for the future of global governance.
Theoretical Framework
1. Power Transition Theory
This Theory asserts that the international order is stabilised under a dominant hegemon sitting at the top of the hierarchical pyramid. The second are great powers, followed by middle and small powers, with earlier colonies at the bottom. However, when dissatisfied, great powers can become an eventual challenger, leading to an international power transition, which is an externality of the domestic transition. Applied to the present scenario, the US withdrawal has allowed challengers like China and India to flip power relations through institutional repositioning (Kugler & Organski, 1998).
2. American Hegemony
Beeson & Higgot (2005) defined hegemony as a great power’s ability to set norms for external relations between states, while respecting their domestic independence. They argued that the US exercised hegemony best through post-WWII global institutions, which declined whenever it practised unilateralism, like in the post-9/11 and current Trump presidency. They emphasised that unilateralism is unsustainable, corrodes American hegemony and pushes powers like China to redefine the global institutional order.
3. Hegemonic Stability Theory
Keohane’s Hegemonic Stability Theory argues that while a dominant nation’s hegemony establishes international order, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to sustain it. Moreover, maintaining dominance is complex and domestic restraints like policy shifts under Trump undermine the country’s ability to uphold its hegemonic role in the global institutional architecture (Keohane, 1984, Chapter 3). This theory helps explain why global governance might sustain or fragment under other states’ interventions as the US hegemony becomes unstable.
Review of the Literature
Frieden (2018) argued that Trump-led economic nationalism is implementing stricter policies, such as tariffs on Chinese imports, which might lead to fragmented regionalism in international trade and force more countries to establish bilateral trade agreements with countries other than the US. Similarly, Bukhari et al. (2025) highlighted potential institutional vulnerability and the rise of global leadership vacuums under the second Trump Presidency. They argued that Trump-led policy changes will create a multi-polar world order, with allied countries losing trust in US leadership, being overtaken by powers like China, fueling geopolitical rivalries and institutional vulnerability, and making the global economy unstable.
Lastly, Dufour & Ducasse (2020) underlined that Trump defends his “America First” ideology and challenges China’s position as a developing country in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a necessity to restore the balance of trade since he believes that international trade is a zero-sum game where the US is a losing party. Moreover, he attacks China through rising tariffs and challenging its position as a developing country in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). They called it a doctrinal shift toward economic nationalism and isolationism that might decline the US’s leadership position in international trade.
Nonetheless, while the existing academic literature offers comprehensive perspectives on Trump’s opposition to multilateralism and the potential power transition by rising powers, it does not examine how non-Western states operationalise influence. Therefore, this paper bridges this gap by uncovering the nuances of China and India’s responses, exploring their different strategic approaches and suggesting future policy implications.
Methodology
This paper adopts a qualitative case study approach, drawing insights primarily from secondary literature such as policy documents, scholarly articles, media coverage and expert analyses. The comparative case studies of China and India are strategically selected, given their increasing global influence and varied responses to the US withdrawal.
Trumpism: Withdrawal from Multilateralism
Since Trump's ascent to power in the White House in 2025, he has initiated a wave of US withdrawals from global institutions. The US first noticed its withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2020, citing mismanagement during the COVID-19 crisis, unjust budget allocation and political influence from member states, which was halted by Biden’s 2021 presidential letter to the UN Secretary-General. However, on January 20th 2025, the administration revoked Biden’s action and echoed its exit, sabotaging the global health governance. The withdrawal will take a year to be processed, as per the 1948 Joint Resolution of Congress regarding US membership in the WHO. (The White House, 2025a; United Nations, 1948).
Likewise, on February 3rd 2025, the US announced withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), reinforcing the 2018 withdrawal over the organisation’s perceived anti-Israel bias. While the Biden government rejoined the UNHRC shortly, it didn’t seek a second term board. Trump also announced funding termination to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) over perceived national losses and linkages with Hamas. Moreover, he signed an executive order to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, which will take a year to implement as per the UN rules. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of the second-largest annual producer of greenhouse gases is symbolic. It pushes the poor countries that bear the brunt of rising climate change and lack the resources to manage it into a further cycle of injustice and deprivation (Kim & Ahn, 2025; Stallard & Poynting, 2025; The White House, 2025b; The White House, 2025d).
Lastly, on February 1, the US imposed a 10% tariff on China and 25% on Canada and Mexico to control fentanyl imports into the US, which soon translated into a full-blown global trade war of retaliatory tariffs worldwide. In the last 6 months of uncertain temporary tariff suspension and revocation, the US administration has turned the ground of global trade into an unstable landscape of fragmented economies, strained inter-state relations and intensified geopolitical rivalries. Such actions culminate in the corrosion of global trade, undermine global cooperation, and accelerate potential power shifts (The White House, 2025c).
China’s Case Study: Health and Institutional Leadership
Amidst the intense trade war and institutional disengagement by the US, China strongly responded with legal action, retaliatory tariffs and institutional diplomacy. From filing official complaints against the “unjust” US tariffs in the WTO to imposing retaliatory tariffs on the US by leveraging its monopoly over 70% global rare earth mineral mining and 90% processing, China’s response was aggressive, coordinated and strategic (Hale, 2025; WTO, 2025).
Moreover, China promised $500 million as financial support to the WHO in the next five years to oppose the US “unilateralism” that compelled the organisation to cut its 2026-27 budget by 21%. However, China’s primary focus is on expanding its influence in global health governance through strengthening bilateral relations, increasing personnel count, and rising leadership in the Global South. For instance, during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit 2024, China proposed establishing a China-Africa Hospital Alliance and a joint medical centre, sending 2,000 medical staff to implement 20 health and anti-malarial projects and upholding the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention for 2025-27. (Kuo & Chiang, 2025; Xinhua News Agency, 2024).
Lastly, empowering its Health Silk Road (HSR) initiative is yet another of China’s revolutionary soft power diplomacy. As an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), HSR was launched to enhance bilateral healthcare infrastructure and bolster global health governance through disease prevention, health policy, research and technology sharing. Besides economic gains, HSR has helped China rise as a powerful alternative to Western designs (Taidong & Dandan, 2023).
Beijing’s strategic deployment of HSR via creating regional health platforms in the Global South, such as the China-ASEAN Forum on Health Cooperation, deploying thousands of medical staff in over 50 countries and reshaping international health norms, underlines a potential future of a China-led global health agency. This highlights China’s unique approach to global leadership that provides an alternative model of global order instead of merely following Western models (Taidong & Dandan, 2023).
India’s Case Study: Strategic Autonomy, Multi-Alignment and South-South Cooperation
Facing discriminatory US tariffs, India stood its ground and strategically challenged not only the Western dominance but growing threats from its South Asian rival, China, through its multi-alignment and strategic autonomy principles. Indian Foreign Policy deploys strategic autonomy as the non-negotiable principle that reserves the country’s right to pursue national interests without aligning with one group. India is fortifying it by making ties with multiple parties simultaneously through multi-alignment, such as deepening engagement with QUAD for maritime security, enhancing exports to ASEAN with bilateral trade reaching $123 billion in 2024–25, pushing for the India-EU Free Trade Agreement by the end of 2025 and continuing maintaing ties with Russia as a strategic geopolitical power (Pande, 2025; The Economic Times, 2025; TOI Business Desk, 2025a).
In addition, India is reinforcing its strategic autonomy by carefully joining the pillars II and IV on Supply Chains Resilience and Fair Economy in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to tackle dependency on China by building resilient and trusted supply chains with partners like the US, Japan, and Australia to tackle China. At the same time, it is maintaining observer status in the trade pillar to balance regionalism and domestic interests (Shweta, 2024).
In Parallel, India empowered the voice of the Global South through regional cooperation at the July 6-7 BRICS Summit by leading discussions on de-dollarisation, supporting transition into BRICS+ by incorporating West Asian and Middle Eastern powers and continuing support to the WHO, UNHRC and UNRWA. India strongly advocated for the development of BRICS Pay as an alternative payment mechanism to conduct trade in national currencies and increase gold holdings by Central Banks to overcome the dollar’s unipolarity. Moreover, India supported the BRICS Climate Leadership Agenda of balancing BRICS growth and enhancing cooperation towards the Paris Agreement while proposing to host COP 33 in 2028 (Earle, 2025; PIB Delhi, 2025).
Notably, along with Brazil, it pushed for permanent membership at the UN Security Council and greater roles at the WB and the IMF. India also backed the BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG) Initiative that aims to strengthen infrastructure and sustainable development across the Global South by reducing potential investment risks. This highlights how India strategically leverages the US-led leadership vacuum through its strategic autonomy and multi-alignment approaches that balance its integration in the global market, the democratisation of the UN and the establishment of parallel institutions to challenge Western-dominated frameworks (PIB Delhi, 2025).
Interestingly, the shared pressure from Washington has created a pragmatic, temporary alignment between the Global South rivals, China and India. After seven years, PM Modi’s confirmation of his upcoming visit to China for the SCO Summit and the signing of agreements to resume direct flights and border trade after the 2020 Galwan clash between the two countries are direct consequences of the US-led geopolitical environment shifts (Davidson, 2025; TOI News Desk, 2025).
However, the tactical warming of bilateral ties does not erase the fundamental, long-term rivalry. The most sensitive terrain of contention is China’s systematic expansion of its economic and military footprint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through its “String of Pearls” strategy, which India perceives as a direct effort to encircle the country and restrain its strategic space. While India leads maritime initiatives like the Colombo Security Conclave, Beijing is faster in establishing stronger ties with island countries by sending aid and channelling infrastructure projects through regional mechanisms like the China-Africa Cooperation and sending sruvey-cum-research and sponsoring maritime militia acting as civilian fishing fleets near Comoros. These increasing Chinese interventions in IOR pose great threats to Indian security and therefore limit the possibility of long-term friendly bilateral relationships between the two countries against the US hegemon (Tambi, 2025).
However, the imposition of another unfair 25% tariff on India by the US on August 6th, over the already imposed 25% approved on July 31, imposed a trade shock on the country. Trump claimed it to be a “penalty” on India for conducting “direct or indirect oil trade” with Russia, despite India clarifying the necessity of importing oil from Russia to meet the national energy demands. These tariffs could potentially jeopardise nearly $40 billion in exports and affect key labour-intensive sectors like textiles, gems and jewellery, seafood, chemical and motive components, which are dominated by national MSMEs. The US has also threatened sanctions imposition on India for purchasing the Russian-made S-400 air defence system earlier in May 2025 as per its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Business Today Desk, 2025; Raghavan, 2025; TOI Business Desk, 2025c).
Nevertheless, the External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has highlighted the “hypocrisy” of the US that did not enforce similar tariffs on China, which imports an even larger share of Russian oil. His bold statement, “If you have a problem buying oil or refined products from India, don't buy it”, clearly underlines India’s refusal to compromise with its long-term imperative of strategic autonomy despite short-term economic losses. Thus, India is preparing to smartly navigate the contemporary trade fluctuations through multiple alignments and South-South solidarity without negotiating its strategic autonomy under economic pressures. (TOI Business Desk, 2025b).
Comparative Analysis: Distinct but Strategic Approaches
The decline of multilateral engagement by the US under the Trump Presidency not only acts as a catalyst for leadership vacuums or creates a single challenger, but a contest over the future of global governance. While neither of the two rising non-Western powers, like China and India, has replaced the US hegemony completely, both hold the potential to embark on an international power shift, with each pulling in a different direction.
China’s strategy characterises an aggressive increase in its participation and leadership in existing global institutions like the WHO, while simultaneously running parallel partnership initiatives like the Health Silk Road initiative to expand its influence through bilateral agreements. This dual approach has enabled China to challenge Western dominance from both within and at the global institutional levels.
On the other hand, India represents the middle power of the Power Transition theory, flagging its strategic autonomy and multi-alignment to balance national growth and South-South cooperation while strengthening ties with Western powers. India’s demand for de-dollarisation and the democratisation of the UN bodies, while asserting leadership through platforms like BRICS, reflects its aspirations to act as the bridge between the developing and developed world, leaving none behind without sacrificing its national interests. However, given the imposition of unjust tariffs by the US, the country might undergo severe economic losses and organise more diplomatic conversations with the US, since further escalating the war through retaliatory tariffs from both sides might further fracture the relationship between the two.
Conclusion
To conclude, while Trump has vowed to lead the US away from global cooperation to embark on a journey of economic isolationism and rising nationalism, the strategic leveraging of the US retreat by India and China signals a world no longer solely anchored to unchallenged Western primacy. By pressing its claims for a permanent UNSC seat, embracing new economic architectures and spearheading the Global South, India is emerging as a leading power that is proactively restructuring the contested multipolar world. The future terrain of global governance will be defined by how these powers institutionalise their responses to gain long-term influence, and how other Global South countries bolster these power-shifting trajectories.
References
The post-World War II global order, championed by US-led multilateralism, is under growing strain amid the shifting power dynamics of the Trump era. While Donald Trump's 2016 presidency challenged global governance, his return in 2025 marked an even pronounced turn in American foreign policy, characterised by unilateralism, economic nationalism and isolationism, institutional disengagement, and intense trade wars under the “America First” doctrine. Deploying a case-study approach based on secondary literature, this paper reveals that non-Western powers like India and China are reshaping global governance by leveraging the leadership vacuum through divergent but complementary pathways. While China pursues aggressive retaliation and parallel institutional models, India balances Western integration with strategic autonomy, multi-alignment and South-South solidarity. These actions are not merely responses to US multilateral disengagement but highlight the potential future transformation of the contested and volatile contemporary world order.
Keywords: Trump, multilateral disengagement, China, India, strategic autonomy, multi-alignment
Introduction
The new world that emerged after World War II was characterised by global institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While built on the foundation of collective security and multilateral engagement for reconstructing the war-damaged world, they functioned as instruments of American hegemony and global leadership for decades (Beeson & Higgot, 2005).
However, with Trump’s return to the US presidency in 2025, US foreign policy took a sharp retreat from multilateralism that not only marked a disruption in the country’s traditional global hegemon role but also created a leadership gap in key arenas of global governance like health, climate change and humanitarian aid, forcing non-Western powers to reevaluate historical Western models. His return thus crystallises two critical questions: can a global order built on US leadership survive the withdrawal of its most powerful member? If yes, who can potentially fill the gap and how? Therefore, this paper examines how China and India are recalibrating their engagement with global institutions differently and what implications this might have for the future of global governance.
Theoretical Framework
1. Power Transition Theory
This Theory asserts that the international order is stabilised under a dominant hegemon sitting at the top of the hierarchical pyramid. The second are great powers, followed by middle and small powers, with earlier colonies at the bottom. However, when dissatisfied, great powers can become an eventual challenger, leading to an international power transition, which is an externality of the domestic transition. Applied to the present scenario, the US withdrawal has allowed challengers like China and India to flip power relations through institutional repositioning (Kugler & Organski, 1998).
2. American Hegemony
Beeson & Higgot (2005) defined hegemony as a great power’s ability to set norms for external relations between states, while respecting their domestic independence. They argued that the US exercised hegemony best through post-WWII global institutions, which declined whenever it practised unilateralism, like in the post-9/11 and current Trump presidency. They emphasised that unilateralism is unsustainable, corrodes American hegemony and pushes powers like China to redefine the global institutional order.
3. Hegemonic Stability Theory
Keohane’s Hegemonic Stability Theory argues that while a dominant nation’s hegemony establishes international order, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to sustain it. Moreover, maintaining dominance is complex and domestic restraints like policy shifts under Trump undermine the country’s ability to uphold its hegemonic role in the global institutional architecture (Keohane, 1984, Chapter 3). This theory helps explain why global governance might sustain or fragment under other states’ interventions as the US hegemony becomes unstable.
Review of the Literature
Frieden (2018) argued that Trump-led economic nationalism is implementing stricter policies, such as tariffs on Chinese imports, which might lead to fragmented regionalism in international trade and force more countries to establish bilateral trade agreements with countries other than the US. Similarly, Bukhari et al. (2025) highlighted potential institutional vulnerability and the rise of global leadership vacuums under the second Trump Presidency. They argued that Trump-led policy changes will create a multi-polar world order, with allied countries losing trust in US leadership, being overtaken by powers like China, fueling geopolitical rivalries and institutional vulnerability, and making the global economy unstable.
Lastly, Dufour & Ducasse (2020) underlined that Trump defends his “America First” ideology and challenges China’s position as a developing country in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a necessity to restore the balance of trade since he believes that international trade is a zero-sum game where the US is a losing party. Moreover, he attacks China through rising tariffs and challenging its position as a developing country in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). They called it a doctrinal shift toward economic nationalism and isolationism that might decline the US’s leadership position in international trade.
Nonetheless, while the existing academic literature offers comprehensive perspectives on Trump’s opposition to multilateralism and the potential power transition by rising powers, it does not examine how non-Western states operationalise influence. Therefore, this paper bridges this gap by uncovering the nuances of China and India’s responses, exploring their different strategic approaches and suggesting future policy implications.
Methodology
This paper adopts a qualitative case study approach, drawing insights primarily from secondary literature such as policy documents, scholarly articles, media coverage and expert analyses. The comparative case studies of China and India are strategically selected, given their increasing global influence and varied responses to the US withdrawal.
Trumpism: Withdrawal from Multilateralism
Since Trump's ascent to power in the White House in 2025, he has initiated a wave of US withdrawals from global institutions. The US first noticed its withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2020, citing mismanagement during the COVID-19 crisis, unjust budget allocation and political influence from member states, which was halted by Biden’s 2021 presidential letter to the UN Secretary-General. However, on January 20th 2025, the administration revoked Biden’s action and echoed its exit, sabotaging the global health governance. The withdrawal will take a year to be processed, as per the 1948 Joint Resolution of Congress regarding US membership in the WHO. (The White House, 2025a; United Nations, 1948).
Likewise, on February 3rd 2025, the US announced withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), reinforcing the 2018 withdrawal over the organisation’s perceived anti-Israel bias. While the Biden government rejoined the UNHRC shortly, it didn’t seek a second term board. Trump also announced funding termination to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) over perceived national losses and linkages with Hamas. Moreover, he signed an executive order to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, which will take a year to implement as per the UN rules. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of the second-largest annual producer of greenhouse gases is symbolic. It pushes the poor countries that bear the brunt of rising climate change and lack the resources to manage it into a further cycle of injustice and deprivation (Kim & Ahn, 2025; Stallard & Poynting, 2025; The White House, 2025b; The White House, 2025d).
Lastly, on February 1, the US imposed a 10% tariff on China and 25% on Canada and Mexico to control fentanyl imports into the US, which soon translated into a full-blown global trade war of retaliatory tariffs worldwide. In the last 6 months of uncertain temporary tariff suspension and revocation, the US administration has turned the ground of global trade into an unstable landscape of fragmented economies, strained inter-state relations and intensified geopolitical rivalries. Such actions culminate in the corrosion of global trade, undermine global cooperation, and accelerate potential power shifts (The White House, 2025c).
China’s Case Study: Health and Institutional Leadership
Amidst the intense trade war and institutional disengagement by the US, China strongly responded with legal action, retaliatory tariffs and institutional diplomacy. From filing official complaints against the “unjust” US tariffs in the WTO to imposing retaliatory tariffs on the US by leveraging its monopoly over 70% global rare earth mineral mining and 90% processing, China’s response was aggressive, coordinated and strategic (Hale, 2025; WTO, 2025).
Moreover, China promised $500 million as financial support to the WHO in the next five years to oppose the US “unilateralism” that compelled the organisation to cut its 2026-27 budget by 21%. However, China’s primary focus is on expanding its influence in global health governance through strengthening bilateral relations, increasing personnel count, and rising leadership in the Global South. For instance, during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit 2024, China proposed establishing a China-Africa Hospital Alliance and a joint medical centre, sending 2,000 medical staff to implement 20 health and anti-malarial projects and upholding the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention for 2025-27. (Kuo & Chiang, 2025; Xinhua News Agency, 2024).
Lastly, empowering its Health Silk Road (HSR) initiative is yet another of China’s revolutionary soft power diplomacy. As an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), HSR was launched to enhance bilateral healthcare infrastructure and bolster global health governance through disease prevention, health policy, research and technology sharing. Besides economic gains, HSR has helped China rise as a powerful alternative to Western designs (Taidong & Dandan, 2023).
Beijing’s strategic deployment of HSR via creating regional health platforms in the Global South, such as the China-ASEAN Forum on Health Cooperation, deploying thousands of medical staff in over 50 countries and reshaping international health norms, underlines a potential future of a China-led global health agency. This highlights China’s unique approach to global leadership that provides an alternative model of global order instead of merely following Western models (Taidong & Dandan, 2023).
India’s Case Study: Strategic Autonomy, Multi-Alignment and South-South Cooperation
Facing discriminatory US tariffs, India stood its ground and strategically challenged not only the Western dominance but growing threats from its South Asian rival, China, through its multi-alignment and strategic autonomy principles. Indian Foreign Policy deploys strategic autonomy as the non-negotiable principle that reserves the country’s right to pursue national interests without aligning with one group. India is fortifying it by making ties with multiple parties simultaneously through multi-alignment, such as deepening engagement with QUAD for maritime security, enhancing exports to ASEAN with bilateral trade reaching $123 billion in 2024–25, pushing for the India-EU Free Trade Agreement by the end of 2025 and continuing maintaing ties with Russia as a strategic geopolitical power (Pande, 2025; The Economic Times, 2025; TOI Business Desk, 2025a).
In addition, India is reinforcing its strategic autonomy by carefully joining the pillars II and IV on Supply Chains Resilience and Fair Economy in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to tackle dependency on China by building resilient and trusted supply chains with partners like the US, Japan, and Australia to tackle China. At the same time, it is maintaining observer status in the trade pillar to balance regionalism and domestic interests (Shweta, 2024).
In Parallel, India empowered the voice of the Global South through regional cooperation at the July 6-7 BRICS Summit by leading discussions on de-dollarisation, supporting transition into BRICS+ by incorporating West Asian and Middle Eastern powers and continuing support to the WHO, UNHRC and UNRWA. India strongly advocated for the development of BRICS Pay as an alternative payment mechanism to conduct trade in national currencies and increase gold holdings by Central Banks to overcome the dollar’s unipolarity. Moreover, India supported the BRICS Climate Leadership Agenda of balancing BRICS growth and enhancing cooperation towards the Paris Agreement while proposing to host COP 33 in 2028 (Earle, 2025; PIB Delhi, 2025).
Notably, along with Brazil, it pushed for permanent membership at the UN Security Council and greater roles at the WB and the IMF. India also backed the BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG) Initiative that aims to strengthen infrastructure and sustainable development across the Global South by reducing potential investment risks. This highlights how India strategically leverages the US-led leadership vacuum through its strategic autonomy and multi-alignment approaches that balance its integration in the global market, the democratisation of the UN and the establishment of parallel institutions to challenge Western-dominated frameworks (PIB Delhi, 2025).
Interestingly, the shared pressure from Washington has created a pragmatic, temporary alignment between the Global South rivals, China and India. After seven years, PM Modi’s confirmation of his upcoming visit to China for the SCO Summit and the signing of agreements to resume direct flights and border trade after the 2020 Galwan clash between the two countries are direct consequences of the US-led geopolitical environment shifts (Davidson, 2025; TOI News Desk, 2025).
However, the tactical warming of bilateral ties does not erase the fundamental, long-term rivalry. The most sensitive terrain of contention is China’s systematic expansion of its economic and military footprint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through its “String of Pearls” strategy, which India perceives as a direct effort to encircle the country and restrain its strategic space. While India leads maritime initiatives like the Colombo Security Conclave, Beijing is faster in establishing stronger ties with island countries by sending aid and channelling infrastructure projects through regional mechanisms like the China-Africa Cooperation and sending sruvey-cum-research and sponsoring maritime militia acting as civilian fishing fleets near Comoros. These increasing Chinese interventions in IOR pose great threats to Indian security and therefore limit the possibility of long-term friendly bilateral relationships between the two countries against the US hegemon (Tambi, 2025).
However, the imposition of another unfair 25% tariff on India by the US on August 6th, over the already imposed 25% approved on July 31, imposed a trade shock on the country. Trump claimed it to be a “penalty” on India for conducting “direct or indirect oil trade” with Russia, despite India clarifying the necessity of importing oil from Russia to meet the national energy demands. These tariffs could potentially jeopardise nearly $40 billion in exports and affect key labour-intensive sectors like textiles, gems and jewellery, seafood, chemical and motive components, which are dominated by national MSMEs. The US has also threatened sanctions imposition on India for purchasing the Russian-made S-400 air defence system earlier in May 2025 as per its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Business Today Desk, 2025; Raghavan, 2025; TOI Business Desk, 2025c).
Nevertheless, the External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has highlighted the “hypocrisy” of the US that did not enforce similar tariffs on China, which imports an even larger share of Russian oil. His bold statement, “If you have a problem buying oil or refined products from India, don't buy it”, clearly underlines India’s refusal to compromise with its long-term imperative of strategic autonomy despite short-term economic losses. Thus, India is preparing to smartly navigate the contemporary trade fluctuations through multiple alignments and South-South solidarity without negotiating its strategic autonomy under economic pressures. (TOI Business Desk, 2025b).
Comparative Analysis: Distinct but Strategic Approaches
The decline of multilateral engagement by the US under the Trump Presidency not only acts as a catalyst for leadership vacuums or creates a single challenger, but a contest over the future of global governance. While neither of the two rising non-Western powers, like China and India, has replaced the US hegemony completely, both hold the potential to embark on an international power shift, with each pulling in a different direction.
China’s strategy characterises an aggressive increase in its participation and leadership in existing global institutions like the WHO, while simultaneously running parallel partnership initiatives like the Health Silk Road initiative to expand its influence through bilateral agreements. This dual approach has enabled China to challenge Western dominance from both within and at the global institutional levels.
On the other hand, India represents the middle power of the Power Transition theory, flagging its strategic autonomy and multi-alignment to balance national growth and South-South cooperation while strengthening ties with Western powers. India’s demand for de-dollarisation and the democratisation of the UN bodies, while asserting leadership through platforms like BRICS, reflects its aspirations to act as the bridge between the developing and developed world, leaving none behind without sacrificing its national interests. However, given the imposition of unjust tariffs by the US, the country might undergo severe economic losses and organise more diplomatic conversations with the US, since further escalating the war through retaliatory tariffs from both sides might further fracture the relationship between the two.
Conclusion
To conclude, while Trump has vowed to lead the US away from global cooperation to embark on a journey of economic isolationism and rising nationalism, the strategic leveraging of the US retreat by India and China signals a world no longer solely anchored to unchallenged Western primacy. By pressing its claims for a permanent UNSC seat, embracing new economic architectures and spearheading the Global South, India is emerging as a leading power that is proactively restructuring the contested multipolar world. The future terrain of global governance will be defined by how these powers institutionalise their responses to gain long-term influence, and how other Global South countries bolster these power-shifting trajectories.
References
- Beeson, M., & Higgott, R. (2005). Hegemony, institutionalism and US foreign policy: theory and practice in comparative historical perspective. Third World Quarterly, 26(7), 1173–1188. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500235777
- Bukhari, S. R. H., Jalal, S. U., Ali, M., Haq, I. U., & Irshad, A. U. R. B. (2025). America First 2.0: Assessing the global implications of Donald Trump’s second term. Qlantic Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 6(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.55737/qjssh.vi-i.25296
- Business Today Desk. (2025, May 9). ‘Hero we held on to’: S-400 defends India after US warned against buying it. Business Today. https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/hero-we-held-on-to-s-400-defends-india-after-us-warned-against-buying-it-475418-2025-05-09
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Meetali Dhaka is currently working as a researcher at the Indic Researchers Forum
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The article reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the views of the organisation.
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