Abstract 

Interdependence led by imports and exports are most nations' primary income sources. Germany and China have become the headlines for most intellectuals and policymakers and Berlin’s interdependence has prompted the overdependence between the two countries. As a prominent player in the automotive, electrical, and chemical industries, Germany is heavily dependent on China, the biggest supplier of electronic equipment and raw materials to the German automotive sector. Aside from this, China makes significant investments in the German market and automobile sector. China while having strong bilateral ties with Germany tends to deviate from the European values and interests, which has led to scepticism towards Beijing. This has transmitted the notice to the European Union, pushing Germany to diversify its trade partners. Germany which finds it difficult to diversify its trade from China to other partners is backed by its presence in the Indo-Pacific. It becomes essential for Germany to trade with other actors in the Indo-Pacific to diversify its trading partners while preserving its position in the region. This paper highlights Germany's trade channel diversification options while discussing the potential challenges in dealing with its over-dependence on China and the steps taken to diversify its trade partners.

Keywords: Overdependence, Trade Relation, Indo-Pacific, Diversification
 

Research question

Will Germany’s overdependence on China lead to diversification or strengthen ties between Beijing and Berlin?

Research methodology

For this paper, qualitative methodology has been selected. Process Tracing has been taken as the primary method to analyse the research questions. Primarily, descriptive and hypothesis-generating and refining case studies have been used in the case study to understand Germany and China's trade relations and the possibilities of Germany finding an alternate trade partner in the Indo-Pacific.
 

Introduction

Germany is regarded as the strongest partner of the European Union (EU), economically and politically. Tracing the economic strength of Germany from the Second World War of the centrally planned mixed economy to the present form of ‘Ordoliberalism’ way of the economy had a larger impact on its relationship with the European Union. Ordoliberalism is a German form of liberal economy where the state regulates the free market economy without advocating for and against the role of welfare states. The economic ties between Germany and the EU evolved with the changing nature of geopolitics.

EU experienced the blow of the economic crisis of 1929 and 2008 which prominently impacted the domestic economy of countries in the region including France, Germany, and the UK. The continuous economic growth in these countries did not help the EU’s overall economy recover from the previous recession resulting in major changes. Germany found its way through economic reform to tackle the recession successfully. While economic recessions in Greece, eastern European countries, and finally Brexit faced setbacks, Germany tried to follow its ordoliberal way of economy, to maintain efficiency through the liberal economic flow of goods and services. (Fouskas V., Gökay B., 2019)

Looking for an alternative to come out of the economic vulnerability and lack of support from the US created a gap in power maxims in the region. While the US was looking to develop its economy neglecting its allies, China played a pivotal role and set an example in the Asia-Pacific.

China opened its economy and began looking to engage in bilateral and multilateral trade with different countries and regions worldwide. In 1983 Germany and China signed the Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIT), which both countries updated in 2003. The agreement primarily focused on Investment protection and dispute resolution mechanisms. Trade relations between Germany and China grew following the development of technology and the need for advanced technical equipment.

Following the geopolitical shift of China as an emerging power, Beijing became a trade partner for Germany. China’s significant presence in the Indo-Pacific and its expanding Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) made it more favourable for Germany to trade in this region. However, the trade relations between the two countries have evolved in response to the increasing criticism of China’s BRI Project and debt trap diplomacy. Additionally, the developing bilateral relations between China and Russia have also shifted Germany’s perspective to diversify its trade partners, especially in light of Russia’s increasing aggression towards Ukraine.

This paper explores the evolving trade and economic relations between Germany and China. Chapter one will highlight the financial ties between Germany and China further discussing its impact on both the countries and how the EU plays a pivotal role in strategic bilateral relations. Further sections of the paper will highlight Germany's attempt to decouple and diversify its trade partners.

Economic relation shaping the Sino-German synergy

With the establishment of the diplomatic relation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of China in October 1972, the trade relation also strengthened gradually completing its more than fifty years of bilateral ties [1]. The relationship between countries goes back to before 1972. Germany invaded Qingdao in 1897 and founded the jiaozhou bay colony. Apart from Qingdao, the Germans controlled the key parts of the Shandong peninsula [2]. Under German rule, the city was developed, and European-style buildings, churches, and dockyards were created. Private investors also invested in banks, factories, and rail lines in the capital city of Beijing.

As a result of the continuous economic boom in the country, Berlin started investing and engaging in trade with the Chinese market. Following adopting a liberal economic model, China was seen as a potential market. Germany engaged in trade relations, particularly in automobiles and machinery, with its emerging ordoliberal authoritarian image in the EU. The historical trade relations shaped throughout the year between Germany and China paved the way for stronger bilateral trade relations.

Bilateral relations have shifted the dominance from Berlin to Beijing which can be traced from the 1970s to the present where Germany is highly dependent on the Chinese for technology-driven companies and stakeholders. Subsequently, Germany's trade with China evolved with the comprehensive strategic partnership in 2014 under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The strong trade relationship between Germany and China further strengthened in 2016 when China exceeded the US and became a prominent trading partner of Germany [3].

Under the “Change Through Trade” policy German Chancellor Angela Merkel looked at China not as a threat but as a potential trade partner to import raw materials and create a market for German manufactured products. Under the chancellor Angela Merkel trade relations grew in a few years breaking the record. Germany traded with China more than other EU countries in the region. Where France and Spain had less than 2% trade with China, Germany exceeded the 20% trade with the country which does not follow the same political model of government. The opposition party criticised the Merkle government for not holding the Chinese accountable for their continuous humanitarian crime in Xinjiang province.

Over the past several years the trade between both countries increased drastically where Germany mostly traded with China for the chemical and automobile industry. China has the highest investment in German companies like Volkswagen and Mercedes Benz, ultimately making Germany dependent on Chinese investments and trade [4].

The increasing importance of the Indo-Pacific provided a strategic ground for countries to have their presence. In 2020 Germany released policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific which shows Germany’s prime interest in the region while managing its Chinese counterpart [5]. Open markets, Free trade, and open shipping rules fulfil Germany’s economic interests making the Indo-Pacific region crucial for Germany and the EU as the global trade hub. China’s presence in the region and increasing dominance while not adhering to international law have created challenges for Germany. To reduce its over-dependence on China and strengthen its position in the region berlin has started changing its foreign policy in the region while looking for an alternate actor to engage with. Although substantive policies to tackle China have not been taken creating vagueness in its foreign policy and inculcating scepticism in bilateral partners like Japan and Australia in the Indo-Pacific.

However, after the COVID-19 restriction and high control by the government in China, there has been a slight decline in investment by German giants. The percentage of investing in Chinese firms has declined significantly. The strict zero-covid policy by China resulted in hesitance among the industries [6]. The shifting pendulum of China’s investment consumption and the recession-like situation resulted in European companies’ diminishing marginal returns causing risk for these companies.

Germany started getting backlash for depending mostly on China following the criticism of the increasing humanitarian crisis in the Xijiang province of China where massive persecution has been carried out against Uyghur minorities [7]. Along with human rights abuses, China has been criticised for its aggressive move in the South China Sea, suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, a threat to Taiwan, and increasing cyber threats that received criticism from the West. These actions forced Germany to diversify its trade and regulate the over-dependence. However, the bilateral trade increased in Germany exporting more automobiles to China compared to its supply to the domestic market [8].

Since 2016, China has been a top trading partner with the record-high trading of goods worth €300 billion in 2022. Companies like Volkswagen, Daimler, BMW, and BASF highly invest in China. These companies are highly reliant on China for their profit. For example, Volkswagen is dependent on the Chinese market for its annual net profit, in 2022 BASF invested €10 billion in China, and almost 254,607 vehicles to China in 2022 were shipped by German carmakers, and Volkswagen produced 3.2 million cars in China in 2022 which amounts to the equal of vehicle produced in Europe. Additionally, in its overseas expansion, Siemens announced plans to invest €140 million in China [9]. China, the world's leading country in automobile production and steel-intensive automobile production in nature has become one of the sellers following its low domestic demand for vehicles [10].

In 2023 the bilateral trade between countries exceeded 250 billion euros making China an important trade ally [11]. The Rhodium group published a study showing the high investment by the four German industries including VW, BMW, Mercedes, and BASF in China [12]. China’s increasing efforts to suppress human rights in the country and strengthen its state control have further pushed Germany to decline to be part of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Even though, Germany is part of Asia’s Development Bank (ADB), ranking as the fourth largest partner. To manage the heightened dependence, Berlin has started looking for an alternate. The political differences between China and Germany shape the economic relationship of the countries. Indo-Pacific being the crucial geopolitical region influenced Germany’s decision to engage with neighbouring countries in the region. Germany has reduced its trade with China from 2019 to 2023. Although the percentage share decreased by 15% from 2022 to 2023 the trade remained high, exceeding EUR 250 billion [13].

The technological demand and economic relation with China cannot undermined completely and hence Germany has started looking for decoupling from China. Complete dependence on Beijing has made Germany vulnerable on four stages: 1) digital engagement in terms of digital trade and intellectual property theft by China 2) Germany; 's automotive sector is vulnerable to China’s electrical vehicles due to high export reliance on China. 3) China’s high investment and stake in Germany's domestic companies 4) import of crucial material and technology including wind turbines, solar panels, and electrolyzers, crucial for renewable energy [14].
 

Domestic Politics Shaping Germany's Foreign Policy

Domestic policies significantly shape and influence a country’s foreign policies. In Germany relations with China have been discussed in the Bundestag following the differing views of the ruling parties in Berlin. The ‘Traffic Light coalition’ of Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Free Democrats parties form the present government of Germany. These three parties hold different views of China as a trade partner creating a divergence in Germany's China policy. SPD has looked optimistically at China whereas the Greens raise questions over China's human rights issue and Taiwan policy. The view of Wandel Durch Handel (Change through Trade) proved a failure when Germany hoped for China to become liberal and democratic [15]. The strategy to deal with China has largely changed from the rule of Angela Merkel to Olaf Scholz. The Ukraine-Russia war has impacted the strategy to engage with China further, making de-risking a priority for Germany.

This overdependence on China also puts a question mark in front of Germany’s investment and its private actors investing in the Chinese firms. Many scholars have forced Germany to decouple the Chinese from its trade relations following the fear of Taiwan meeting the same fate as Ukraine. But realistically Germany can't stop its trade and investment with Beijing as it will cost Berlin's economy and overall economic growth of the countries, impacting several traders and private actors in the country.

The whole picture shifted from Germany being the dominant player to China taking centre stage where Germany imported goods worth 191 billion euros in 2022 comparatively higher than the 2021. Germany exported comparatively less to China, accounting for the total 84 billion trade deficit. Germany is mainly dependent on China for importing critical raw materials for meeting the target of cleaner energy and transport in the country as highlighted by the head of the global economy department Lukas Menkhoff at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) [16]. In the co-chaired dialogue on Oct 1, 2023, between the German finance minister and Chinese vice premier, He Lifeng issued a joint statement to strengthen the bilateral trade. In the dialogue, countries agreed to contribute to each other's economy through trade and sustainable growth with the principle of inclusivity, further signing the 25 consensus.


 

Image- 1 Balance of payment statistics (Deutsche Bundesbank, August 2023)

Image 1 shows Germany and China’s trade relationship where Germany’s subsequent rise in imports from China declined in the first quarter of 2023 resulting in a trade deficit between both countries. Image -2 shows the high investment in 2022 by Germany in China, as Germany tried to diversify and de-risk its economic dependence on China the percentage share of its trade and investment declined in the first quarter of 2023.


 

Image- 2 Balance of payment statistics (Deutsche Bundesbank, August 2023)

Berlin’s China strategy is primarily driven by the concern over China's attempt to reshape the international order by not adhering to basic human rights principles posing a threat to Germany's national security and economic interests. While Germany is interested in diversifying its trade the policies adopted and the agreement signed show contradictory pictures. China’s Ocean Shipping company- Cosco’s acquisition of a stake in Hamburg container is an example of it [17]. Cases of intervention to reduce the Chinese acquisitions have also taken place, including Kleo Connect where Germany blocked the takeover of a satellite start-up by a Chinese firm [18]. On the other hand, the sale of Man Energy Solutions’ gas turbine division to China also looked as a critical matter by Berlin [19]. Germany is at the point where it can no longer ignore the need to diversify its trade partners and rely on China as a trusted partner.
 

EU and Germany: Differing Values with China

Duncan Freeman in his paper highlights China's economic involvement in the EU from the 1970s due to the decreasing financial dominance of the USA. As a growing economy, China has significantly contributed to the EU’s economic development, making it critical for the EU to engage strategically. Although initial trade policies favoured trade with Beijing, the increasing humanitarian abuse in China in its Xinjiang province and nonadherence to the EU’s values have raised concern over increasing closeness and dependence on China.

Trade agreements between countries are made under the EU Trade policy, where countries decide their strategic ties, bilateral relations, and economic interests [20]. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's visit to Beijing in November 2023 created a spark in the EU. This visit, which included business delegates from China, showed Germany’s priority for bilateral relations while ignoring the EU's stance.

With technological developments and high investments in tech companies in China, it became the hub of cheap products. As shown in image 3 the tech-driven industry carried out the highest import from China.

Image-3 Ifo Business Survey, (IFO Institute, February 2022)

The EU became the largest trade partner to China following the growing trade relation with major EU countries such as France, Germany, and Spain. As China continues to evolve economically and politically, Europe faces the challenge of ensuring that its economic foundation with China benefits both sides and contributes positively to global economic integration. This entails navigating complex trade dynamics, advocating for fair practices, and ensuring that China's integration into the international economy aligns with shared objectives.

Following China’s stand on the Ukraine war and constant support to Russia has increased concerns in Brussels forcing the EU to adopt defensive economic measures and policies while decoupling from China. These include a foreign direct investment screening mechanism, a white paper on state subsidies, a 5G ‘toolbox’ aimed at restricting access for non-European telecommunications manufacturers—primarily from China—and a recent anti-coercion instrument [21]. The continuous criticism of China for its atrocities in Xinjiang, the EU imposed sanctions on four Chinese officials and one entity. The strategic and technological autonomy of the EU was discussed after the 2024 election where imposing a 45 per cent tariff on imported Chinese Electrical Vehicles (EVs) sparked debate among Chinese officials resulting in the postponement of the decision taken by the EU [22].

Although the economic ties remain significant, China supported millions of jobs for Europeans while increasing its imports in the region. This shows the EU’s vulnerability to any future war or political crisis leading to price rises affecting European citizens along with a shortage of necessary products.

Where decoupling cannot be completely adopted as a strategy against the china by EU and Germany de-rising can be a tactic that can be considered to deal with China. Although de-risking cannot be taken as a standalone strategy, diversifying the trade partner can be strengthened further. De-risking deals extensively with economic and political aspects without completely breaking the ties with the country. China’s growing presence in technology and cyberspace has been neglected initially which has now been highlighted following the increasing cyberattacks in Germany and the EU. The increasing cyberattack creating vulnerability should be looked beyond de-coupling and de-risking.
 

Role of the Indo-Pacific for Germany

The interdependence theory explicitly mentions the country's mutual economic, political and strategic relations. Interdependence affects the partner in trade if there is a change in policies in the partner country. Wallerstein talks about the world system theory where countries are interdependent [23]. Keohane and Nye’s ‘complex interdependence’ helps to understand Germany’s China outlook. From the 1990s Germany increased its engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, understanding the region's growing open market and economic and political significance. Geoeconomics and geopolitics shape Germany’s foreign policy of the Indo-Pacific.

The geostrategically crucial region of the Indo-Pacific shapes the balance of power between countries. The presence of the US and China in the region shapes the strategic relations of the countries. Various multilateral and bilateral organisations have also shaped the importance of the region connecting the continents of Africa and Asia[24]. China being the largest country in the region and having a continuously growing economy has attracted Germany to continue its bilateral trade and relations. The relationship between both countries gradually evolved from economic and political to sectors including research & innovation, education and cultural exchange. These bilateral ties positioned China as Germany’s dominant partner [25]. Germany to reduce its dependence on China in the region introduced several measures including policies such as Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2020 [26], Strategy on China in 2023 [27], and the National Security Strategy in 2023 [28]. Berlin looked at China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival competing to become the superpower.

Germany started enhancing its relations with the middle power by sending troops and having their military presence in the region. Where Germany wanted to diversify it from depending completely on one key actor in the region, China interfered with increasing Germany’s presence in the Indo-Pacific. To maintain the balance of power Germany has started engaging with middle powers in the region including Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and Singapore. By this stand, Germany has clearly outlined its diplomatic relationship with democratic partners sharing similar values. However, half of Germany’s trade and economy is carried out through China compared to all these countries in the region.

The German chancellor Olaf Scholz and the foreign minister Annalena Baerbock have emphasised the need for de-risking but not while completely ignoring China. China was the first destination that Olaf Scholz visited after COVID-19 following Baerbock’s three-day visit to China. After the Merkle government, speculation was about taking a firm stand against the Chinese counterpart for violating the humanitarian principle and not adhering to the WTO rules [29]. The human rights advocate Annalena Barebock, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Germany has not taken any “Decoupling measures” against the Chinese counterpart. However, it cannot be overlooked that trade with China has been reduced in the first quarter of 2023 as compared to the first quarter of 2022.

Thus, Germany while navigating its way to prepare a strategic policy to maintain its presence in the Indo-Pacific while trading with China for its automobile and technology sector needs to look for strategic alignment with potential actors in the region. The adaptive trade strategy with risk mitigation and trade balancing can provide an option for Germany to not depend solely on China but have collaborative engagement with other nations as well.
 

Conclusion

Germany's economic relationship with China highlights the significance of challenges and opportunities. The economic relations of both countries are greatly shaped by the mutual benefits especially in the automotive and technology sectors although it has led to overdependence that shows the strategic vulnerability of Germany. China’s assertive policies and not adhering to the EU’s values and WTO guidelines have forced Germany to reevaluate this dependence.

Germany’s move towards engaging in bilateral and multilateral agreements and organisation reflects the strategic shift in its foreign policy to reduce overreliance on China. However, the dependence on tech and automobile sectors has increased the complexities of seeking alternatives in the region. While Germany tries to find an alternative it maintains its strategic position aligning with its national and economic interests.

The European Union’s context and differing views create further complications for Germany’s ties with China. The EU’s constant push for adhering to European values and interests while respecting human rights often clashes with China’s practice of non-interference, which has created challenges to navigating the middle path. Germany while derisking tries to balance its economic and political responsibilities in europe while engaging in bilateral trade dialogue.

In conclusion, Germany's relationship with China is at a turning point. The future trajectory will depend on Germany’s ability to look for an alternative and diversify its trade partners alongside facing the inherent risk of economic challenges looking at the advancement of China’s tech industry and the existence of the There Is No Alternative (TINA) factor. Where middle powers in the Indo-Pacific such as India, Japan, South Korea and Australia play a crucial role their tech-driven trade is comparatively very low creating a dilemma for Germany of de-couple from China. The Indo-Pacific region offers a potential channel for diversification, but the path ahead will require strategic and careful alignment with its economic, political and diplomatic considerations.
 

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