Introduction

Japan, known for its quick economic development and technological innovation, is currently dealing with a severe problem: a declining population. Fertility rate, which is a crucial determinant of the demographic structure, has been falling for the past five decades. The Country witnessed its highest total fertility rate in 1971 at 2.16 but since then, it has started to decline. By 2005 the rate was 1.26 and by 2020 it stood at 1.33. This figure falls far below the replacement rate at 2.1 and is further expected to decline in the coming years (The report on declining birth rate 2022). Simultaneously, Japan has also been experiencing a significant increase in its elderly population (those 65 years of age and older) since the mid 1980’s due to increase in longevity. In 2017, this demographic group constituted 27.7 % of the population, marking the highest proportion in the world. Projections indicate that this trend will persist, with the elderly population expected to rise to 38.4 % by 2065 (Nakatani 2019). This declining birth rate and rapidly ageing population have had profound implications for Japan's economy, social structure and overall development trajectory. This strain on the social service, healthcare system and labour market, coupled with the challenges associated with an ageing workforce, have posed significant hurdles for Japan’s policymakers. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that Japan is not the only country facing such demographic challenges. Similar situations can be observed in other nations such as South Korea, Singapore, various countries in the East Asia & pacific region as well as in parts of Europe including France and countries within the European Union (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2018, pp.4).

What Causes Japan’s Population to Decline? Three specific reasons

Urbanisation

There is a complex interplay between a country’s population decline, urban development, and lifestyle changes. Japan, which once experienced robust postwar economic growth and emerged as an industrial superpower, what Anne Allison (Allison 2015,p.37) calls the 'era of Toyota-ism'. This marked a significant transformation in Japanese society, where increased productivity and economic stability has led to the rise of a prosperous middle class (Shirahase 2015,p.12). During this era, there is a clear link between family dynamics and the capitalist system, which helped to sustain Japan's capitalist structure. In the post-war period, men who were traditionally considered to be the breadwinners, worked long hours, while the family, particularly married women returning to the workforce after raising their children, provided cheap labour to enterprises (Allison 2015,p.39-40). However, this economic success came at a cost. The competitive global edge attained by Japanese businesses, thanks to innovative methods like quality circles and just-in-time production, led to an intensification of working hours (ibid,p.36). Consequently, daily life became heavily focused on productivity, leaving little time for social interactions and familial responsibilities. This intensive emphasis on work created a society where individuals found themselves increasingly isolated and disconnected, leading to feelings of loneliness (ibid,p.37). Urbanisation has also further altered traditional family structures. In pursuit of better economic opportunities, the population started migrating from rural to urban areas. Previously multi-generational households were common, which provided support for childcare and eldercare, with the emergence of urban lifestyle this diminishes leaving a void for caregiving which earlier living in traditional households used to get fulfilled. (Shirahase 2015,p.12) In the early 1990s, Japan further experienced a prolonged era of stagnation, commonly known as Japan’s “Lost Decades”.During this era which Motoaki Takahara (cited by (Allison 2015,p.41) calls the ‘era of unsafe nationalism,' companies began downsizing, restructuring, or merging their employees, leading to layoffs and rising unemployment rates. There was also a shift from regular, long-term employment to short-term, non-regular employment (ibid,p.41). These irregular workers, often referred to as 'freeters'—a term combining 'freelance' and the German word 'arbiter' meaning “worker”—became prevalent. Globalisation further pressured companies to cut costs, which made them relying increasingly on this temporary workforce. This insecure employment and strained finances led young couples to defer marriage, especially among men, who, still expected to be breadwinners, and support families, a lack of good, secure jobs created a class of men who found themselves unable to afford starting a family. (Semules 2017)

The escalating costs associated with raising children, as highlighted in The Economist Report (cited in The Economist Intelligence Unit report 2018), reached a level where many families, despite having desire to have multiple children, were practically limited to having only one child due to the financial burden. Anne Allison noted that this economic insecurity has also made women reluctant to marry male irregular workers or freeters (Allison 2015,p.44). Therefore, in my opinion this has significantly impacted the declining birth rate and the choices of having children made by women. which has indeed led to a sharp decline in the fertility rates. As argued by Ogino, in a high-tech society, having children becomes a conscious choice. Contraception, timing of conception, spacing of pregnancies, and abortions for various reasons have become so common that unplanned families are considered rare exceptions. Life in such a society is a matter of choice, although these choices are not made in a vacuum but based on the options provided by society. (Ogawa 2005,p.372-373)

Immigration

The second variable which I have found important is ‘immigration’. Japan is very much reluctant towards immigrants, especially for unskilled labour. A lack of significant immigrants means there are fewer new, young residents to offset the ageing population. One of the primary reasons for this reluctance lies in Japan’s deeply ingrained cultural homogeneity. Where most of the population shares a common language, culture and history, fostering concern about preserving their unique identity (Shirahase 2015,p.26). Despite 2.13 million foreigners registered in Japan in 2010, accounting for 1.67 percent of the total population, the share of permanent foreign residents remained notably low at 26.5 percent, with Chinese, Brazilians, Filipinos, and Koreans comprising the largest distinct alien groups. This cultural cohesion has historically made Japan resistant to large-scale immigration (ibid,p.26). According to a Poll conducted by the daily Yomiuri Shinbun in April, 2014 , Most Japanese people seem to be in agreement on this issue. According to the survey of 1,512 respondents, 54 percent were against the idea of welcoming more foreigners, whereas only 34 percent were open to the prospect. There is also another prevailing perception in the mind of the Japanese nationals that foreigners often resort to crime (Ryan 2015). As a result of which discrimination against foreign workers still persists. Immigrants also often face prejudice due to limited proficiency in the regional language and their willingness to adhere to cultural norms, accentuating the integration challenges (Coulmas 2007,p.119).

Historically, the Government stance on foreign labour has also played a crucial role in shaping its immigration policies. The first national employment plan in 1964 declared Japan's intention not to rely on foreign workers during its economic development phase, solidifying the government's position against substantial immigration. This was again further enhanced by the second (1973) and Third (1976) employment plans (Shirahase 2015,p.26). As a result ,by the late 1980s, Japan's manufacturing sector, including its renowned automobile industry, faced a significant challenge due to the severe scarcity of unskilled labour, which had the potential to seriously disrupt its operations (Tsuda 2004). Addressing these challenges, the United Nations recommends a significant increase in immigration from the current annual intake of approximately 50,000 individuals to a level of 650,000 or even higher. The ageing population means that a declining workforce is responsible for supporting a growing number of retirees, funding their pensions and healthcare. This creates an urgent need to either rapidly expand Japan's tax base by welcoming more immigrants or consider raising taxes and reducing benefits for everyone. In such a situation, rising the level of immigrants is actually beneficial for a country like Japan. Immigrants can contribute to Japan's capacity for innovation and the creation of new wealth through their fresh ideas, language and cultural diversity. It encourages global connections, and entrepreneurial spirit (Osawa & Kingston 2015,p.72). For instance, the recent wave of Chinese immigrants since the 1990s showcases the valuable role immigrants can play by leveraging their international networks and facilitating trade and investment opportunities. (ibid 2015,p.73)

Reluctant to Marry

The third variable which I have taken into my study is ‘Reluctant to marry’. There is a growing trend among people in their 30s in Japan who have never been married and have no intention of marrying. This trend is causing significant concern in a country that is already grappling with a rapidly ageing and shrinking population. The Cabinet Office's 2022 gender report reveals that 25.4% of women in their 30s and 26.5% of men in the same age group have no desire to get married. Additionally, slightly over 19% of men in their 20s and 14% of women in their 20s share similar sentiments, indicating a notable portion of the younger population has no plans to wed (tokyo 2022). Connecting this data to arguments made by Sawako shirahase we will get a reason for such reluctance. According to Sawako Shirahase (Shirahase 2015,p.16), the primary factor leading to a decline in the number of children is the exorbitant expenses associated with raising and educating them. As previously stated in the earlier variable, individuals in unstable job situations are already facing significant challenges. It is inconceivable for them to support more than one child and survive financially. Before industrialization, it was considered normal and inevitable that mothers would assist in the fields as long as they were physically able to, with in-laws or siblings taking care of younger children (Rosenbluth 2007,p.14). Though we can find such instances of in-laws taking care of children in rural areas. But as we have discussed, with rapid urbanisation people have been migrating from rural to urban, leaving their parents or in-laws in search of better opportunities. This leads to the absence of child caring and rearing by their parents which contribute to couples not having children, because they simply can’t simultaneously manage child rearing and their profession due to a severe hectic schedule. As pointed out by Wilson Quarterly, the rates of childlessness have been generally rising throughout the Industrialised world since 1945. He further stated that about 18 percent of Japanese women born in 1950 ended up having no children (Eberstadt 2012,p33).

Further, the limited transformation in the division of labour based on gender terms indicates that the core social norms still revolve around gender roles. This factor contributes to the declining appeal of marriage among the younger generation. Traditionally, men are anticipated to provide financial stability for their families. Yet, during prolonged economic downturns, young men face growing challenges. Securing full-time employment, making it hard for them to establish and sustain new families. According to Jeff Kingston and Machiko Osawa (Osawa & Kingston 2015,p.69) , Young people have a harder time making the transition from school to work, they change jobs very often, experiencing longer duration of unemployment. Women are often inclined to cite their desire to maintain personal freedom as a common reason for not choosing marriage (Shirahase 2015,p17). Additionally, When a woman takes a break from her career to care for children, the company's investment in her diminishes. If she doesn't return, the investment is lost entirely. Women are made to choose either to secure a place in the core workforce or find themselves in the less secure realm of part-time employment (Rosenbluth 2007,p.10). This shift has led women to prioritise their independence in the workplace, relegating marriage to a secondary role.

The Main Factor

Having examined the impact of all three variables, In my opinion the foremost factor driving Japan's declining population is the 'Reluctance to Marry.' As previously elaborated, a substantial segment of Japan's younger generation is grappling with extensive repercussions that reverberate throughout the nation's economic, social, and cultural landscape. The prevailing challenge persists as men, traditionally perceived as the primary providers for their families, encounter considerable obstacles such as securing stable employment. Meanwhile, women exhibit diminished interest in embracing motherhood, citing the significant sacrifices it demands, leading them to opt for singlehood and independence. In this section, I will be further examining in detail the factors that are leading to such reluctance among the couples, which in a way acting as a reason for Japan’s Demographic dilemma.

Traditional Gender norms & Cost of living

In Japan, traditional gender roles still have their roots. Confucianism, which has greatly influenced the development of Japanese culture, stresses a hierarchical social structure, which assumes subordinates obedience to superiors and men’s dominance over women and children. Japan, although initially was more egalitarian but further developed a strong patriarchal society based on confucian values ( Sugihara & Katsurada 2002,p444)

As argued by (Otake,1977) (cited by Sugihara & Katsurada 2002.p 444) that these confucian values have been stressed and encouraged in modern Japanese society as well leading to a more gendered division of society. More people, particularly men, became wage earners as the economy developed, apparently spending little time or no time at all at home. As Anne Allison pointed out, "A company man would devote not only long hours to work but also evenings, weekends and vacations to “leisure” (drinking, golf) spent in the company of fellow workers” (Allison 2015,p40). Such workaholic nature of men affected their romantic relationships directly leading towards decline in the rates of fertility.

Apart from traditional values, Japan has been struggling to recover from its prolonged recession that began in the early 1990’s. Certain series of adjustments for restructuring have been introduced not only by the government but also by a majority of business firms, which have in turn affected job security among the employees. These increased economic uncertainties have considerably affected the earnings of married Japanese couples of reproductive age and their decision of when and how many children to have (Ogawa 2005,p372-373).

Changing attitude towards marriage

There is also a surge of alternative lifestyles apart from the traditional role. As we have discussed, with rapid economic development & industrialisation of Japan, the need for a more and efficient skill work force increased. This void was filled by the women. Though women’s rights movement and achievement of equal education of sexes partially help to bring out the women's voices. However, the main reason for such an surge is the realisation that a single wage is not enough to maintain living standards. Young people were deliberately avoiding marriage, some even decided not to have children because raising children, with all education, housing facilities is expensive (Sugihara & Katsurada 2002,p.445). According to economist Morinaga, as Cited by (Coulmas 2007,p.41), The cost of a child's education in Japan, spanning from kindergarten to university graduation, ranges from 5 million to 10 million yen. Excluding the expenses like private classes, living costs, and hobbies are not included. Considering the average annual household income of 5.8 million yen in 2003, this financial burden discourages couples from having more than one child, or even any child at all. Further scholars like Arichi (1993) (Sugihara & Katsurada 2002,p.445) also highlighted that this excessive economic burden, desire to enjoy their own lives, desire to work gives women a reason for not having a child. This trend among the young men and women towards marriage led to the increase in their marriage age. For example During 1950-2005, the age at first marriage increased by about four years for both men and women. This delay in marriage led to a later age for having the first child and a decrease in the number of children per woman (Coulmas 2007,p.39). Similarly, Ogawa (Ogawa 2005,p.372) argued that this burden has not only reduced probabilities of first marriage but also has lowered the possibilities of having first and second birth contributing to falling fertility.

Conclusion

Thus, Japan’s declining population is resulting from interplay of various Social, economic, and cultural factors. Out of which “The reluctance to marry” stands out to be the most influential one. Traditional gendered norms, economic uncertainties and changing attitudes towards marriage, family life are the central driving force behind such attitudes contributing to the country's demographic decline. Rapid urbanisation and high costs of living have also significantly affected the younger generation’s ability and willingness to start families. We have also found out that Japan’s resistance to significant immigration rooted deeply in cultural homogeneity. Historically government policies have limited the influx of new, young, residents, exacerbating the ageing population issue. The shift from extended to nuclear families and the changing role of women in the workforce have also played pivotal roles in reshaping Japan's demographic landscape. Addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted approach, involving reforms in social norms, workplace policies, and economic structures. Encouraging more inclusive gender roles, providing stable employment opportunities, and implementing supportive family policies could help mitigate the declining fertility rates. Likewise, opening up to controlled immigration and fostering a societal shift toward embracing diverse family structures could also contribute to a more balanced demographic future for Japan.

Reference

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