Abstract –

The paper examines the evolution of conflicts in the Middle East, analysing how great powers Like the USA, Russia and China each with their respective geopolitical ambitions have shaped the regional conflicts through indirect intervention. The chapter also discusses how the geopolitical landscape of West Asia was significantly influenced by colonial powers, particularly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the borders and nation-states that emerged, largely products of British and French colonial ambitions.

The article aims to discuss how Russia’s military intervention in Syria strengthened the Assad regime, while the U.S. support of the opposition groups has reshaped the conflict. Similarly, Iran’s backing of the Houthis in Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s counter efforts reflect deeper geopolitical struggles. Libya remains divided between Russian-backed forces and Western-aligned factions.

Moreover, the chapter highlights China’s emerging role in the region, particularly its diplomatic efforts in brokering peace between Saudi and Iran and its influence in the region primarily through its Belt and Road Initiative. The chapter assesses the impact of these proxy conflicts on global power structures. It discusses potential future trends and will observe if China deepens its engagement in the region or maintains a non-interventionist approach.

Keywords – Middle East, proxy conflict, Cold War, China, Syria, Yemen.

Objectives –

• To examine the historical evolution of proxy conflicts in the Middle East.

• To explore China’s emerging role in the Middle East.

• To assess the role of great powers in shaping regional conflicts through indirect intervention.

Review of Literature –

The research paper entitled “In Pursuit of General Theory of Proxy Warfare” 2019, by Major Amos C. Fox presents a theoretical exploration of proxy warfare, delving into its definitions, implications and strategic frameworks. Fox argues that the U.S. military’s current approach to proxy warfare lacks a coherent doctrine, which complicates operational understanding and effectiveness.

The euphemistic language often used to describe proxy operations obscures the realities of such engagements. The paper advocates for the development of a general theory that is rooted in historical and contemporary examples, departing from U.S.-centric methodologies. The conclusion synthesizes the paper’s arguments, stressing that proxy warfare is not merely a tactical option but a dominant form of conflict in current geopolitical climate. The author calls for an actionable doctrine and a comprehensive understanding of proxy environments to equip military leaders with better for future conflicts.

Amos C. Fox's paper entitled “On Proxy War A Multipurpose Tool for a Multipolar World”, encompasses several key themes, theories and dynamics relevant to understanding proxy relationships in contemporary international relations.

Fox elaborates on how proxy wars differ fundamentally from traditional alliances and coalitions. While alliances involve cooperation between states with shared interests, proxy wars focus on risk transfer, here one actor offloads its combat responsibilities onto another entity. This vital distinction highlights the varying motivations behind engagements in proxy conflicts and their implications for international stability.

The study offers frameworks that clarify the motivations behind varied proxy arrangements while acknowledging these relationships' evolving nature and potential consequences in a multipolar world. Notably, the reliance on secondary sources and the evolving theoretical landscape are limitations often recognized but needed to parse the realities of proxy warfare and its implications for global politics.

Frank Hoffman and Andrew Orner in their article, The Return of Great Power Proxy Wars, published on War on the Rocks in 2021, explore the resurgence of proxy warfare as a dominant method of geopolitical competition. The authors argue that in the modern of era great power rivalry, states like the USA, China Russia increasingly engage in proxy conflicts rather than direct military confrontation.

The authors define proxy wars as conflicts where external states support local actors to advance their strategic objectives while avoiding direct involvement. This aligns with previously scholarly works, such as Andrew Mumford’s studies on proxy warfare, which highlight how states use intermediaries to manage conflicts without triggering full-scale wars.

The article further expands on this concept by including state-sponsored militias, private military companies, cyber actors, and economic coercion as modern extensions of proxy strategies.

Hoffman and Orner analyse recent conflicts in Syria, Ukraine and Yemen to illustrate how great powers utilize proxies. Russia’s support for separatists in Ukraine and its military involvement in Syria exemplify Moscow’s reliance on indirect engagements. Similarly, China’s use of maritime militias and cyber-enabled influence operations shows a preference for low-cost deniable forms of conflict.

Hoffman and Orner’s article contributes to the literature on modern warfare by emphasizing the return of proxy conflicts as a primary method for great power competition. By integrating historical analysis, contemporary case studies, and theoretical perspectives on hybrid warfare, the article provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the strategic environment of the 21^st century.

Stephen Watts, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Cristian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, Ariane M. Tabatabai, Sara Plana, Brandon Corbin, and Jeffrey Martin in their research Report entitled “Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition” examines the causes and military implications of proxy wars, the report addresses four major questions – Why do external states provide military support to parties to civil war? , Do these motivations provide any indication of whether proxy wars especially those involving major or regional powers, might increase substantially within the time horizon currently driving long-term U.S. defence planning (i.e. through 2035)? Suppose a state not currently engaged in proxy wars were to decide dramatically to expand the geographical or military sophistication of its proxy activities. How long would it take that country to develop the necessary capabilities to do so?

The report also discusses how major powers often engage in proxy wars out of a sense of acute vulnerability to the actions of other states. As they develop their capabilities, they frequently engage in proxy wars on a wider basis.

Introduction –

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower defined proxy wars as “the cheapest insurance in the world,” while former Pakistani President Zia-Ul-Haq deemed them necessary “to keep the pot boiling in existing conflict zones. The allure of warfare on the cheap has proven irresistible for nations throughout history.

Throughout history, great powers have often vied for influence by supporting proxy forces. The Cold War, for example, cannot be accurately described as a “long peace” when one considers the number of externally supported intrastate conflicts and shadow wars that erupted during the time. There is no indication that the ongoing U.S. competition with China and Russia will differ from previous historical patterns. ¹

Both China and Russia have a longstanding history of employing indirect warfare strategies and have compelling reasons to avoid direct military confrontations with the United States. China for example have historically backed proxies in Vietnam and North Korea.

Some analysts contend that China continues to engage in sophisticated influence operations and salami-slicing tactics that halt the confrontation. These tactics often employ merchant and fishing fleets as surrogate assets.

Similarly, Russia has a deep-rooted history of utilizing indirect strategies and considerable operational experience in promoting separatist movements and mercenary forces in unconventional warfare. Evidence of Russia’s reliance on these indirect methods is evident in its ongoing actions in Ukraine and Syria.²

Proxy wars emerge from a complex interaction between a benefactor—whether a state or a non-state entity—and selected proxies that serve as intermediaries for the benefactor’s provision of armaments, training, and financial support.

Essentially these conflicts allowed states to pursue their geographical objectives while circumventing the direct costs and casualties of traditional warfare. By leveraging proxy forces, benefactors can influence outcomes in a conflict zone while minimizing their military footprint and the risks inherent in direct engagement¹.

The ascent of China has been a focal point in the geopolitical discourse, and Andrew Mumford’s observations provide a more nuanced perspective. He argues that alongside China’s rise, we are likely to witness more and more utilization of indirect strategies aimed at recalibrating the balance of power between the U.S. and China. This shift is expected to increasingly involve proxies, driven by substantial economic interdependence characterizing Sino-U.S. relations. ³

As Dominic Tierney aptly points out, potential Chinese interventions pose a significant challenge to international stability and U.S. security. He predicts that as China’s interests expand, heightened by its demand for energy minerals and raw materials its perceived stake in the stability of various regions will grow accompanied by an enhanced propensity to leverage its capabilities for intervention.

Tierney suggests that the Chinese government may recognize local actors as essential allies in safeguarding its interests while mitigating the risks associated with provoking other major powers. By backing surrogates and adopting a strategy that aligns with “my enemy’s enemy” Chinese policymakers could potentially achieve advantages with a lower risk profile.⁴

States engage in proxy warfare driven by a complex interplay of geopolitical, ideological, domestic and economic factors. Geopolitical and to a lesser extent ideological motivations typically serve as the primary motivations for these conflicts, while political and economic considerations primarily function as constraints.⁵

Geopolitical factors appear to be of the utmost importance when it comes to deciding whether to support violent non-state actors (VNSAs), as observed across numerous states and contexts. The tendency to utilize proxy warfare proactively, even in regions far removed from a state’s borders, often stems from reactive concerns about the vulnerability of the state’s own security to adversarial proxy actions.

However, once states have established these proxy warfare capabilities, they tend to deploy them more broadly than merely to address the initial vulnerabilities.

This phenomenon has been discernible in various states including the People’s Republic of China under Mao and post-1979 Iran. Russia’s increasing involvement in civil conflicts such as those in Syria, Libya, and Mali which are located from its borders.

It is important to note that postrevolutionary regimes are more likely to support VNSAs than other states. State ideology also plays a crucial role in shaping which VNSAs most states will consider supporting, for example, Iran usually supports Shia groups, while the Soviets and China tend to back leftists and communist groups. Additionally, the government's beliefs can influence how it sees threats from rival countries.

Despite proxy warfare usually costs less directly for the country backing it than traditional warfare, our case studies showed that there can be significant indirect costs. Sometimes the groups that are supposed may act against the interests of the sponsoring country, cause problems or escalate conflicts with other countries. If the sponsoring country gets directly involved in a situation that began as a proxy war, the costs can increase dramatically.

In many situations, countries that support proxy forces have chosen to stop these relationships or have decided to avoid proxy warfare for a while. This is often because of the indirect costs and risks of becoming directly involved in the conflict.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war serves as a clear example of a proxy war, as the U.S. and its Western allies are actively supplying weapons, military equipment and billions of dollars in support of Ukrainian forces (Shedrack & Azubuike, 2022), this situation suggests that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine aims for a regime change, targeting the pro-U.S. president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

According to Muhammad and Nilufar (2020), one of the primary motivations behind the Russian invasion is the perception of the threat posed by Ukraine’s transition to a liberalized state, moving out of Russia’s sphere of influence.

Ukraine’s aspirations for closer cooperation with Western countries particularly in areas of trade, security and politics including potential access to NATO and the EU further threaten Russia’s national security. These factors have propelled Russia towards military action, with the intent to install a new Ukrainian government that aligns closely with Russian interests.

The United States has engaged in similar operations in the West Asia and Africa. For example, it has supported the Kurdish “People’s Protection Units” against the Islamic State in Syria and collaborated with armed groups in Libya to combat terrorism and assist anti-Gaddafi rebels during 2011 regime change efforts.
 

Components of Proxy War -

• Provision of Manpower – Proxy wars share similarities with other forms of conflict, particularly regarding the critical role of manpower in determining outcomes. As proxy interventions typically occur within the framework of existing wars such as civil wars, benefactors often view their support as a means of indirectly increasing the number of “boots on the ground” through surrogate forces or non-combatant military advisers (Dayal, 1976). The USSR in particular extensively utilized manpower as a form of proxy assistance. As the Cold War unfolded, they allowed their military advisers in proxy conflicts to engage in an increasingly broad range of activities.
  
  Additionally, its is it is important to note that a significant role that the provision of manpower can serve is supporting coup and counter-coup operations. On numerous occasions, the USSR sponsored proxy forces in the developing world to safeguard ally regimes from the threats of coups. For instance, in June 1966, Massamba-Débat, the president of Congo-Brazzaville (present-day Congo), received protection from Cuban surrogate forces when the Congolese army took control of the capital in a military coup.

• Provision of Material – The provision of military materials, including arms, ammunition and other military technologies by benefactors to their selected proxies serves as the primary method for these benefactors to delegate fighting responsibilities. This approach allows them to achieve specific objectives without involving themselves directly in the complex realities of warfare (Herry, 2008).

The supply of weapons stands as the most powerful symbol of proxy wars representing engagement in conflict from a distance. Between 1965 and 1972, the USSR exported around $6.5 billion worth of arms to various countries in Asia, with nearly half of that amount allocated to North Vietnam during its war against the United States. ⁶
 

• Provision of Non-Military Assistance – Joseph Nye famously conceptualized the idea of ‘soft power’ in world politics as the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or financial incentives (Nye, 1990).

Soft power emerges from a nation’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Nye’s analysis of soft power is particularly valuable for evaluating forms of influence that extend beyond traditional coercive military methods, as it encourages an exploration of alternative strategies for intervention.

The inherently indirect nature of proxy wars means they do not necessarily fit neatly into the category of a perpetual ‘hard power’ intervention. Military assistance is not always a prerequisite.

While coercion may serve as an underlying theme in many such conflicts, this does not negate the possibility that a proxy may seek out a benefactor's support due to the appeal of their political ideology. Additionally, a benefactor may highlight the attractiveness of their worldview to attract allies in strategically significant regions.

During the Cold War, the Kremlin tried to strengthen its influence in developing nations by supporting Marxist–Leninist vanguard parties. This means they encouraged specific political groups that followed these ideas to help gain more control and support in specific regions.

The West Asia as a battleground for geopolitical competition –

In the collective memories of the people across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), great power rivalries have significantly influenced the region’s destiny at various critical junctures. In the early 20th century, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War 1, colonial competition between Britain and France led to the creation of modern borders and nation-states in the Middle East. By the century’s end, following five Arab–Israeli wars, treaties and essential peace negotiations were mediated by great powers, particularly the United States.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait marked a pivotal moment, leading to the permanent deployment of the U.S. military forces in the Middle East. A cascade of events – most notably the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 – set the stage for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which ultimately positioned the United States as the predominant power across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

However, this dominance has been challenged by a series of geopolitical crises, exacerbated by the expanding influence of Iran, the emergence of several non-state actors, the enduring Israel – Palestine conflict, and growing scepticism among U.S. allies regarding American security guarantees.

Currently, the MENA region is central to strategic competition with its major power rivals China and Russia. China’s focus has increasingly shifted towards securing reliable energy supplies from the Gulf states, while Russia aims to consolidate its influence by supporting its limited allied regimes and undermining the U.S.-led security framework in the region.

This multi-layered competition shapes the dynamics of international relations in MENA, underscoring the complexity of the strategic landscape.

Middle Eastern nations have consequently adapted their foreign policies and forged new alliances while maintaining existing relationships. For small and medium-sized countries, this approach is fundamental to geopolitics, safeguarding interests and enhancing autonomy in an unpredictable world involves diversifying reliance on various partners. This strategy serves as a prudent form of insurance policy.

Historical Context: Proxy Wars during Cold War in South and West Asia

Soviet and U.S. interventions in Egypt, Iran, and Afghanistan –

Afghanistan

The Soviet engagement in Afghanistan was facilitated through the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist-Leninist party composed of two factions: Khalq (masses) and Parcham (banner). Named after their respective newspapers, these factions had several ideological differences, as well as ethnic and personal rivalries (Bennett, 1999).

Established in 1965 and led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, the PDPA split into factions as mentioned earlier in 1967 but was reunited in 1977. While all founding members of the party were part of Afghanistan’s highly educated class, there were notable distinctions between the two factions. Khalq predominantly consisted of rural Pashto speakers, whereas Parcham members were more aligned with Soviet ideologies and primarily Dari speakers.

In April 1978, following a coup against Afghanistan’s first president, Mohammed Daoud Khan, the PDPA came to power under Taraki, leader of the Khalq faction, with both Khalq and Parcham members in the government.

The level of Soviet involvement in the coup is unclear, but the Soviet Union quickly recognized Taraki’s government, signing twenty bilateral agreements and increasing the number of Soviet military advisers to 700. (Levite, Jentelson, & Berman, 1992).

The Soviet attempt to depose Afghani premier Hafizullah Amin failed. On September 16, 1979, Amin was elected as president. He wanted to make Afghanistan more stable and improve relations with the United States. To do this Amin was willing to send away Soviet many Soviet advisors who were in Afghanistan.

They wanted to keep Afghanistan as part of their influence and stop it from country becoming friendly to the United States or the rest of the West. So the leaders decided to send the troops to Afghanistan.

At that time, they were not worried about other countries interfering, especially since the Iranian revolution had taken place. This meant that there was less chance of Iran or the U.S. to get involved in Afghanistan. As a result, the Soviet Union felt safe to invade without the risk of American soldiers responding.

U.S., Saudi and Pakistan began to initiate a Mujahedeen campaign to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy was simple they would use Pakistan and Saudi to radicalize the Afghani people and use them to wage jihad against the Soviets.

In 1979, Pakistan began to mobilize Afghani people and state bringing them to Pakistan. Saudi sent religious clerics to Pakistan. The Saudi narrative frustrated and alienated the people of Afghanistan and they wanted to wage a war against the Soviets to protect their religion.

This motivated the Afghani people to pick up arms and resist the Soviets. This is where the Americans stepped in and supported the Afghani people by giving them arms, ammunition and money. Saudi Arabia radicalised the Afghani people while Pakistan provided them with training.

Apart from the support from the United States, the actors were drawn to the religious values that the Mujahedeen defended, which significantly enhanced their military capabilities. The U.S. compensated approximately fifty commanders of Mujahedeen with around $60,000 per month to bolster their fight against the Soviet Union, alongside receiving ammunition and advanced weaponry such as Stringer missiles.

The Soviet Union ultimately recognised that it could not achieve its objectives in Afghanistan through military force. In 1987, they appointed Mohammed Najibullah as the new prime minister of the PDPA government, as he was deemed more capable of garnering support for the PDPA government, from various segments of Afghan society compared to his predecessor.

Following international negotiations with the U.S. and Pakistan, the Soviet Union began formulating plans for their withdrawal from Afghanistan. While attempting to withdraw without undermining the authority of the PDPA, their efforts met with limited success. Ultimately, the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and by 1992, the Mujahedeen government overthrew the PDPA government.

Iran – Iraq

The Soviet leadership was caught off guard by the Iranian revolution, even more so than the Carter administration in the United States, although the USSR’s interests were less directly impacted. While there was no shortage of information, the dramatic collapse of the Shah’s regime contradicted three key Soviet perceptions of developments in Iran.

The first perspective depicted Pahlavi’s regime as the primary ally of the United States and assessed Iran’s military capabilities as superior to any external or domestic threats. The second perspective focused on leftist opposition—particularly the Tudeh (or Masses) party—and exaggerated the strength of the Shah’s intelligence service, SAVAK.⁷

The third perspective characterised the Islamic movement as archaic and dismissed Ayatollah Khomeini as a marginal figure. None of these interpretations of the Iranian revolution yielded useful insights into the events and the resulting misinformed recommendations led to a series of blunders that ultimately contributed to the collapse of the USSR just 12 years after the transformation in Iran.

The misconceptions emerged from three distinct bureaucracies – initially from the military intelligence (GBU) and then from the General Staff, secondly, from the KGB and finally, from the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The fall of the Pahlavi monarchy in early 1979 had profound global ramifications, yet no state felt its impact more than Iraq. The regime of Saddam Hussein, a longstanding adversary of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, had provided refuge to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini for several years during his exile.

However, following the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the revolutionary leadership in Tehran swiftly identified Iraq as a primary geopolitical adversary. While many states struggled to recalibrate their foreign policies in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, Iraq’s strategic miscalculations were particularly consequential.

Its decision to engage in military conflict with Iran initiated a prolonged period of regional instability and protracted warfare, the repercussions of which continue to shape West Asian geopolitics.

Khomeini’s exile stemmed from his opposition to the Shah’s pro-western policies, particularly Iran’s close ties with the United States. In 1964 he was expelled to Turkey before relocation in 1965 to Najaf, a significant Shia religious centre in Iraq, during that time Iraq and Iran had maintained a deeply adversarial relationship, exacerbated by territorial disputes and ideological divergence during the Cold War. Iraq, which benefited from substantial Soviet military support, found itself on the opposite side of the geopolitical divide from Iran, further intensifying tensions between the two regimes.⁸

The United States' foreign policy in West Asia was fundamentally centred on the Shah of Iran, as a key strategic ally, the Shah served as a cornerstone of American influence in the Persian Gulf region. To bolster his regime, the United States provided Iran with substantial military support, amounting to billions of dollars of arms transfers. Consequently, the fall of Shah in 1979 was perceived as a significant geopolitical setback by American policymakers.

In contrast, the United States had no formal diplomatic relations with Iraq, rendering it a complex and opaque target for American intelligence operations. Washington often relied on intelligence assessments provided by the Iranian government under the Shah, which frequently proved inaccurate.

During his exile in Najaf, Ayatollah Khomeini received cover assistance from Iraqi intelligence services in orchestrating a subversive campaign against the Shah’s regime. The Shia pilgrimage to Najaf facilitated clandestine communication between Khomeini’s network and operatives within Iran.

Additionally, recordings of Khomeini’s sermons were smuggled into Iran in the form of cassette tapes, serving as a crucial instrument in mobilizing opposition against Shah’s regime.

Saddam Hussein ascended to power in Iraq following a coup in 1968, initially exercising authority from behind the scenes for the subsequent decade. During this period, Saddam strategically leveraged Khomeini as a tool against the Shah, while the Shah, provided support to a Kurdish insurgency opposing Saddam’s rule with assistance from the CIA.

This proxy conflict continued till 1975 when Iraq and Iran signed the Algiers agreement. Under the terms of the treaty, Iran was granted territorial concessions along the Shatt al-Arab waterway in exchange for ceasing its support for the Kurdish rebellion.

Despite the diplomatic settlement, Saddam did not sever ties with Khomeini as he had with the Kurdish insurgents. Instead, Khomeini remained a central figure in Islamic opposition to the Shah, actively fostering militancy against the Shah’s regime until the onset of the Iranian revolution.
 

Russia’s involvement in Syria and Libya –

Over the past decade, Russia’s role in the Levant and its engagement in the region’s power politics have substantially transformed, largely driven by shifts in geopolitical and regional dynamics. A pivotal factor in this transition has been the gradual orientation of the U.S. foreign policy away from prolonged military engagements in the Middle East.

This strategic recalibration by Washington created a geopolitical vacuum that Russia sought to fill, particularly following the failure of former U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2013 red-line policy which was intended to deter Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad from using chemical weapons against civilians. The absence of a decisive U.S. response provided Moscow with an opportunity to assert a more proactive role in the region.

By 2015, Russia had significantly expanded its presence in the Levant, leveraging the ongoing societal upheavals and conflicts to reshape regional dynamics in a manner conducive to its strategic objectives. Moscow adopted a pragmatic foreign policy approach, positioning itself as a key power broker in the Syrian conflict.

Through a combination of military intervention, diplomatic manoeuvring, and strategic alliances, Russia sought to balance its relationship with various state and non-state actors while ensuring that its national interests remained paramount.

In pursuing this strategy, Russia has actively worked to redefine the regional security architecture to align with its long-term geopolitical ambitions. By fostering alliances with key regional players and maintaining a flexible approach to conflict mediation, Moscow has been entrenched as an indispensable actor, challenging Western influence and reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria provided the Kremlin an opportunity to assert its power and expand its influence in broader West Asia. However, over time, the effectiveness of this strategy diminished due to the inherent limitations of Moscow’s political leverage and economic capabilities. In response, Russia adopted a more opportunistic and pragmatic foreign policy in the region characterized by a transactional compartmentalized approach to regional diplomacy. ⁹

This strategy enabled Russia to engage with all key regional actors involved in the Syrian conflict while maintaining a degree of flexibility in its alliances. Moscow positioned itself as a mediator capable of balancing competing interests, particularly by managing Iran’s presence in Syria while simultaneously fostering strategic engagements with Gulf states and Israel.

The recent fall of Damascus in December 2024 represents a geopolitical shift of historic significance, underscoring vulnerabilities inherent in alliances predicated on coercion and strategic convenience. A cornerstone of Russia’s reassertion on the global stage, Syria now exemplifies the limitations of military-backed authoritarian resilience.

Despite years of Russian support ranging from airpower and mercenary deployments to information warfare Bashar Al Assad was ultimately unable to withstand the pressures of both internal dissent and shifting external dynamics.

For Moscow, this development constitutes not merely a setback but also an impetus for strategic adaptation. Evidence of this recalibration is already emerging, as Russian military assets reposition southward in the Mediterranean. The redeployment of troops and military hardware to eastern Libya signals a shift in focus, with Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar playing a central role in Russia’s evolving strategy. ¹⁰

Meanwhile, western states are intensifying diplomatic efforts to engage Haftar’s inner circle, dissuading Libyan actors from facilitating a broader Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean. This unfolding geopolitical realignment highlights the fluid nature of regional power struggles and the continued contestations of influence among regional and global actors.

The evolving geopolitical landscape reflects a deeper continuity in Russian foreign policy rather than a mere substitution of proxies. Moscow’s engagement in Syria has never been solely about territorial gains rather it has been a broader effort to counter Western influence while reinforcing its strategic position in the Mediterranean. The deployment of Russian jets from Hmeimim Airbase to Libya in 2019 to support Khalifa Haftar’s offensive in Tripoli was not an isolated manoeuvre but a precursor to a more extensive realignment.

Iran-Saudi rivalry as a proxy war hub –

Yemen -

As the two predominant actors in West Asia, Iran and Saudi Arabia have engaged in a longstanding rivalry that extends beyond their immediate borders, influencing the broader geopolitical dynamics of the region.

One of the most prominent manifestations of this rivalry is the ongoing conflict in Yemen where both nations have been engaged in a proxy war since 2015. This protracted struggle has not only exacerbated regional instability but has also had significant implications for other conflicts, including the Israel-Palestine issue.

The geopolitical landscape in West Asia is shaped by ideological and strategic competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as both states seek to expand their influence directly and indirectly.

Their contest for regional hegemony has contributed to the fragmentation of political alliances, intensified sectarian divisions, and perpetuated cycles of conflict. The interplay of these factors underscores the broader ramifications of their rivalry, which continues to reshape the political and security dynamics of West Asia.

Iran’s strategic involvement in Yemen constitutes a critical component of its broader geopolitical agenda aimed at extending its influence across West Asia. Central to this strategy is Iran’s longstanding relationship with Houthi rebels, a neo-Zaidi faction that traces its ideological and religious lineage to the Zaidi tradition within Shia Islam. This relationship serves as a counterbalance to Saudi Arabia’s regional dominance, reinforcing Iran’s position in ongoing geopolitical rivalry.

Iran’s support for the Houthis manifests in various forms, including financial assistance, military training, and the provision of advanced weaponry, such as ballistic missiles and drones.

These military assets have been utilized by the Houthis to target strategic locations, including military installations and critical infrastructure within Saudi Arabia.

A notable instance of this occurred in September 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s oil processing facilities, a strike that momentarily disrupted global oil supplies. This event underscored the broader ramifications of Iran’s proxy strategies in the region and their impact on global energy security.

Iran’s support for the Houthi movement in Yemen has enabled Tehran to establish a significant strategic foothold along Saudi's southern border and the Bab-al-Mandeb strait, a critical maritime chokepoint through which a substantial portion of global oil shipments pass. This positioning grants Iran considerable Influence not only over Saudi Arabia’s security but also to a certain extent, over the broader dynamics of the global energy markets.

Lebanon –

Iran’s influence in the region has encountered substantial challenges in recent years, primarily due to escalating conflicts in the region, pertaining to Israel Palestine, and involvement of the U.S. One of the most significant setbacks has been the weakening of Hezbollah, Iran’s long-standing proxy in Lebanon.

A combination of Israel's military operations and heightened international scrutiny has constrained Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. Notably, the assassination of Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah, represented a critical turning point, further diminishing the group’s momentum and effectiveness.

Historically Saudi Arabia has maintained a significant presence in Lebanon, particularly among the Sunni population. The kingdom’s strategic interests in preserving the regional balance of power and countering Iran’s expanding influence in Lebanon have been a key driver of its engagement in the country.

One of the primary mechanisms through which Saudi has exerted its influence has been its support for Sunni political factions, most notably the Future movement led by the Hariri family, whose political alignment has historically been consistent with Saudi objectives.

In addition to its political engagement, Saudi Arabia has provided substantial financial assistance to Lebanon, particularly in the aftermath of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. This economic support has been aimed at stabilizing Lebanon’s financial system and reinforcing its alignment with Saudi policies.

However, Saudi Arabia’s influence in Lebanon has increasingly been challenged particularly due to the growing power of Hezbollah’s expanding military and political influence has significantly weakened Saudi Arabia’s position in Lebanon, complicating its broader regional strategy.

Iraq –

Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has actively sought to expand its influence in Iraq, leveraging both political and military channels to assert its presence. During the early 1980s amid the Iran-Iraq war, Iran played a pivotal role in the establishment of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its military wing, the Badr Corps.

Both SCIRI and Badr aligned with the Khomeinist doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which upholds the authority of a clerical leader as a supreme ruler of an Islamic State. Given this ideological alignment, SCIRI and Badr Corps maintained close ties with Iran and effectively operated as an extension of the Iranian Quds Force.¹¹

In addition to supporting SCIRI and Badr, Iran also provided backing to the Islamic Da’wa Pary, although party’s leadership remained divided on fully accepting Iranian religious political authority. The Da’wa party was implicated in several high-profile terrorist attacks including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait.

Despite this, the Badr Corps remained Iran’s primary proxy in Iraq and played a crucial role in the uprisings that followed the first gulf war in 1991. Throughout the 1990s, Iran continued its support for the Badr Corps, enabling the group to establish an extensive network across Iraq an infrastructure that would later prove instrumental I shaping Iraq’s political and security landscape.

Since 1984, the United States has sought to counteract Iran’s network of proxy militias in the Middle East through a combination of economic sanctions and diplomatic measures, avoiding direct military confrontation across six presidential administrations, from Reagan to Biden, successive U.S. governments have implemented punitive measures to curtail Tehran’s regional influence.

The Trump administration (2017-2021) notably intensified these sanctions, expanding their scope and application. However, these measures have not fully succeeded in dismantling Iran’s financial support to its proxies. ¹²

In 2020, the U.S. Department of State estimated that Iran provided Hezbollah with approximately $700 million per year, while Palestinian militant groups including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad historically received around $100 million annually from Tehran.

The Reagan administration first designated Iran as a sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, yet it was not until the Clinton administration that sanctions were directly imposed on Iranian proxy groups. In 1995, Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Shiite and Sunni militant organizations operating in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories were formally sanctioned. Between 1995 and 2022, five successive administrations continued these efforts, sanctioning a total of 11 Iranian-backed militias across five countries as well as 89 leaders affiliated with 13 different groups.

U.S. sanctions are outlined as follows –

• Clinton administration – Sanctioned three groups (Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and six leaders.

• George W. Bush administration – Maintained sanctions on the same three groups and expanded measures to include 14 additional leaders.

• Obama administration - Introduced sanctions against Kataib Hezbollah and 34 of its associated leaders.

• Trump administrations – Expanded sanctions to six additional groups Ansar Allah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Fatemiyoun Division, Al Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al Mukhtar along with 32 leaders.

• Biden administration – Reversed the designation of Ansar Allah while imposing sanctions on three additional leaders.

U.S. Policy in West Asia –

Since World War II, the U.S. policy in West Asia has undergone various adaptations in response to shifting geopolitical landscapes. However, the fundamental organizing principle underlying American engagement in the region has remained largely consistent: the strategic containment of perceived threats.

Whether countering Soviet influence during the Cold War, addressing the rise of nationalist Arab leaders, combatting transnational terrorist networks, or confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran following its establishment in 1979, U.S. policy has been primarily driven by the objective of maintaining American dominance in regional affairs.

To achieve this objective, the United States has relied heavily on cultivating regional alliances through security partnerships, military assistance and strategic cooperation. This approach has often prioritized geopolitical stability and counterbalancing adversarial forces over direct investment in the socio-economic development of the region’s population.

As a result, U.S. policymakers have frequently supported autocratic regimes deemed moderate or strategically valuable, even when such governments engaged in repression. These alliances were viewed as a pragmatic necessity for safeguarding American interests, reinforcing a pattern in which security imperatives took precedence over democratic governance or human rights considerations in U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. ¹³

Under the banner of the Global War on Terror, the United States undertook a series of significant military interventions in the region aimed at countering emerging nonstate threats, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While these military campaigns aimed at counter threats posed by non-state actors like AL-Queda and other Sunni extremist groups, the motivations behind the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 remain a subject of debate. Notably these interventions were also framed to promote democracy, shifting from the previous era characterized by a focus on threats.

The Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda” encompassed initiatives to foster democracy, civil society and the rule of law in Iraq and the wider region. However, chaos in Iraq and the emergence of new extremist groups largely overshadowed this agenda.

At the beginning of his first term, President Obama wanted to change the way the U.S. interacted with the Middle East. He expressed this goal in his well-known speech in 2011, saying that he wanted the U.S. to engage with the region based on shared interests and respect for the people.

He believed that the U.S. should care not only about the stability of the countries but also about the rights of individuals living there, he mentioned that the key focus of U.S. foreign policy should be to promote reform and support countries in moving towards democracy.

However, even though Obama tried to centre his approach on the people and took advantage of the hope from the Arab Spring, his actions did not change much from the previous administration's practical concerns. The rise of ISIS made it necessary for the administration to concentrate on fighting terrorism and building a coalition with other countries to address this threat.13

Iran continues to be of major focus of U.S. regional policy whether in Syria, Iraq, Yemen or beyond. In fact, significant U.S. security missions in the region, even those not primarily not centred on Iran, often incorporate counter-Iran elements. A notable example is the Counter–ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), which despite its stated objective of combating Islamic state, is underpinned by counter Iran motivations.

Following the fall of Assad, the U.S. sent Barbara Leaf, the State Department’s top Middle East official, to meet with Sharaa, subsequently lifting the 10$ million bounty that had been placed on his head during his time as an Al-Queda operative. This action signalled Washington’s intent to establish direct communication with Syria’s new leadership and possibly influence the country’s future.

Since 2011, Syria’s narrative has unfolded in increasingly unpredictable ways. Although the U.S. initially backed the opposition forces against Assad, this support dwindled as the groups struggled to effectively counter both Assad’s regime and extremist factions, such as Al-Nusra and ISIS.

In 2014, the U.S. intervened directly by deploying troops and supporting Kurdish forces to combat ISIS. Until Assad’s fall, the U.S. presence in the region also sought to limit the influence of Iran and Russia in Syria and the broader Middle East. ¹⁴

Despite the diminished influence of both Iran and Russia in Syria several strategic imperatives continue to justify the sustained presence of U.S military forces and diplomatic engagement in the country.

This evolving landscape presents an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to assume a more proactive role in shaping Syria’s political transition, aligning the emerging post-conflict order with broader U.S. objectives for a pro-western regional framework.

To this end, Washington's continued deployment of approximately 2,000 troops in Syria remains a critical component of its strategy, ensuring a direct and influential role in shaping the country’s future trajectory.

Beyond its military presence, the U.S. also maintains substantial diplomatic and economic leverages over Syrian authorities, positioning itself as a key actor in the country’s post-war reconstruction and governance.

Recent U.S. policy measures, including the provision of sanctions waivers for transactions related to energy sales, humanitarian assistance and personal foreign remittances, reflect a dual approach of strategic engagement and economic pragmatism. These initiatives serve as a both demonstration of goodwill and a calculated policy tool aimed at fostering stability while reinforcing U.S. influence and Syria’s evolving political landscape.

Russia’s Wagner Group Involvement in Libya –

Wagner Group’s involvement in Libya serves as a tool of Russian foreign policy, beginning in early 2017 with initial engagement in demining operations. Their significant participation commenced in May 2018, when approximately 300 mercenaries supported the Libyan National Army (LNA) in various military endeavours.

Wagner’s influence expanded during LNA’s 2019 offensive to capture Tripoli, bolstered by substantial financial backing from the UAE. Although they faced setbacks due to the Turkish military intervention in support of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Wagner redirected its efforts to defend strategic positions in eastern Libya, constructing defence lines and collaborating with regional militias, including the Sudanese Janjaweed and Chadian militia.¹⁵

Throughout its operations, Wagner group has employed a variety of military tactics and equipment including drones anti-aircraft systems armoured vehicles etc. Politically Wagner has supported the LNA and established contacts with Saif al Islam Gaddafi son of Muammar Gaddafi to influence Libyan politics in favour of Russia’s interests.

Libya remains deeply fragmented between the UN back Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the rival administration controlled by the Libyan National Army. Within this geopolitical landscape, the Wagner group’s alignment with Haftar has granted Russia strategic access to Libya’s substantial oil reserves and gold deposits, which are among the world’s top fifty in volume. This resource exploitation strengthens Russia’s energy dominance across the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa.

By supporting Khalifa Haftar Russia has positioned itself to exert influence over one of the world’s most critical oil-producing regions. Control over Libya’s energy sector enables Moscow to consolidate its role in the global energy market while simultaneously expanding its role geopolitical footprint in Africa. This strategic manoeuvre not only reinforces Russia’s economic leverage but also serves as a broader extension of its influence in shaping regional security and economic dynamics.

China’s Strategy in West Asia –

China’s economic and political engagement in West Asia has expanded considerably in the past decade, particularly following the Arab Spring and amid growing perceptions of the U.S. retrenchment from the region. Beijing has traditionally pursued a strategy of diplomatic equilibrium, fostering relationships with diverse regional actors while avoiding direct involvement in conflicts.

However, as China’s global standing strengthens particularly among developing nations and great power competition intensifies, Beijing has adopted a more assertive approach, positioning itself as a potential alternative and a counterbalance to U.S. influence in the region.

A key instrument of China’s involvement in the region is its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, which has significantly deepened economic ties between China and regional states. Since 2016, China has emerged as a leading foreign investor in the Middle East, initially focusing on energy trade and infrastructure development.

Over time Beijing, has broadened the scope of its engagement to include smart city initiatives, technological innovation hubs, and the deployment of advanced telecommunications networks, such as 5G.

This evolving strategy underscores China’s commitment to integrating the Middle East within its broader vision for global connectivity and economic cooperation.

The Western perspective of China’s evolving role in the region has changed over time. Initially regarded as a non-threatening free rider that passively benefited from the U.S. security infrastructure in the region, China is now increasingly viewed as a formidable challenger to the U.S. and broader Western interests.

The shift reflects Beijing’s expanding economic and strategic influence, particularly as the United States has reduced its energy imports from the Middle East, creating an opportunity for China to strengthen its position.

China’s trade relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have experienced remarkable growth, rising from approximately $10 billion in 2000 to over $230 billion in 2021. This substantial increase has not only reinforced China’s economic footprint but has also contributed to the gradual erosion of Western influence in the region.

Moreover, China’s growing emphasis on technological development and its pursuit of greater technological autonomy have further shaped its engagement with Middle Eastern states, deepening cooperation in sectors such as artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure.

Saudi Iran Deal – A Win for China?

On March 10, 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran announced the normalization of their diplomatic relations, an agreement facilitated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In a joint trilateral statement, the two states declared their commitment to resuming diplomatic ties, reopening embassies and diplomatic missions within two months, upholding principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.

As part of the agreement, both nations reaffirmed their intent to implement two long-standing but previously unexecuted bilateral accords – General Agreement for Cooperation in the Fields of Economy, Trade, Investment, Technology, Science, Culture, Sports, and Youth signed in 1998 and Security Cooperation Agreement signed in 2001. ¹⁶

These agreements had remained dormant due to escalating tensions, culminating in severance from diplomatic ties in 2016, as Saudi Arabia and Iran found themselves on opposing sides of the conflict in Yemen and Syria. This deal signifies a potential shift in the geopolitics of the region, highlighting China’s emerging role as a mediator.

China’s role in brokering the normalization of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not driven by altruism but instead by a calculated manoeuvre aligned with its broader strategic goals in the Gulf. Stability in the region is imperative to China’s expanding economic and geopolitical interests, particularly in securing energy resources and deepening economic partnerships.

The Gulf is central to China’s energy security, given its significant reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Since surpassing the U.S. as the world’s largest crude oil importer in 2017 importing approximately 8.4 million barrels per day, China has prioritized maintaining stable relations with key oil suppliers. In 2022, Saudi Arabia remained China’s top oil, supplying 1.75 million bpd, while Iran despite facing U.S. sanctions ranked as China’s third largest supplier after Saudi Arabia and Russia.

Beyond energy security, China has actively pursued economic integration with the Gulf States through strategic partnerships and joint ventures. Notably in August 2022, Saudi Aramco signed an MoU with Sinopec, China’s state-owned energy cooperation, to explore avenues for collaboration.

This partnership builds upon preexisting joint ventures, including Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Company (FREP) and Sinopec Senmei Petroleum Company (SSPC) in China and Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company (YASREF) in Saudi Arabia. These agreements underscore China’s long-term commitment to strengthening economic ties with Gulf states.

While the Saudi-Iran agreement represents a diplomatic success for China, it also poses a significant challenge. The durability of the rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran remains uncertain, raising questions about China’s ability to sustain its newfound role as an international mediator.

Moreover, Beijing faces the delicate task of maintaining balanced relations between two historically adversarial regional powers. Despite these challenges, China’s involvement in Middle Eastern diplomacy signals its broader ambitions to establish itself as an alternative power broker to the U.S. under its Global Security Initiative (GSI). This development reflects China’s growing footprint in shaping regional politics and its regional strategic intent.

India’s Strategic Interests in West Asia - Challenges and Opportunities

India’s West Asia policy is built upon three key pillars: Gulf Arabs, Iran and Israel. Notably, none of these entities trust each other and find themselves in conflict. Balancing relations among them has been challenging yet crucial for India’s national interests. Energy security ranks a top priority for India, aiming to ensure a stable and reliable long-term energy supply. India has become the world’s third-largest consumer of energy and is poised to increase its consumption further in the coming decades. West Asian countries have traditionally been India’s primary suppliers of crude oil, with Iraq emerging as the largest supplier in 2023, followed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. ¹⁷

India views territories in West Asia, particularly UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as preferred trading partners. Trade volumes between India and these nations have consistently risen. West Asian countries perceive India as a rapidly expanding economy capable of competing with major global economies. Currently, India is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to enhance economic ties with West Asian countries. India also seeks to attract Foreign Direct Investment from wealthy Gulf nations, which have significant potential for investment across various sectors in India, yielding mutual benefits. ¹⁸

India’s immediate reaction to Hamas's October 2023 attack on Israel was a strong condemnation of terrorism and a show of solidarity with Israel, setting a new precedent in its diplomatic signalling. However, this stance evolved with time by December 2023, India supported a UN resolution for a ceasefire in Gaza and reaffirmed the two-state solution.

India’s abstentions in November 2023 and April 2024, on key UN resolutions – about alleged human rights violations and calls for an arms embargo on Israel highlights India’s policy of strategic autonomy. These votes signal India’s cautious approach, seeking to balance bilateral ties with Israel while avoiding overt deviation from multilateral norms.

In recent times Israel has emerged as a prominent defence partner for India, with strengthening ties specifically under the Modi government, India’s collaboration with Israel can also be seen with regional groupings such as I2U2 (India, Israel, U.S, UAE).

I2U2’s strength is its flexibility and focus, distinguishing it from larger, more cumbersome institutions. While groupings like BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) aim for formal expansion and geopolitical weight, I2U2 offers an alternative: a modular, task-oriented framework that could enable dynamic coalitions built around specific functions, sectors and shared priorities.

The I2U2+ model – centred on rotating coalitions of willing partners – can be deployed to respond rapidly to emerging climate and development challenges. Rather than seeking to expand membership permanently, I2U2+ invites external partners to plug into ongoing initiatives where their capacities and interests align. This structure enhances both agility and relevance, allowing for scalable cooperation without institutional gridlock. ¹⁹

Safeguarding the interests of the Indian diaspora, which comprises around nine million individuals, is a significant aspect of India’s strategic objectives in West Asia. The Indian diaspora in the Gulf region plays a crucial in contributing to foreign currency reserves. India is the world’s leading recipient of remittances, as reported by the World Bank on Remittances and Migration. According to the Reserve Bank of India, from 2014 to 2022, the Gulf region accounted for 28% of total remittances sent to India. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are the primary sources of these remittances due to the substantial Indian expatriate communities residing there. ²⁰

India’s Strategic Outlook in West Asia –

The geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran continues to manifest across West Asia, particularly through proxy engagements in Lebanon and Yemen. A significant generational shift is underway, marked by new leadership in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar.

These leaders appear less constrained by the ideological legacies of their predecessors and demonstrate greater openness to transformative opportunities. Concurrently, gulf economies are actively exploring post-fossil fuels futures by channelling their hydrocarbon wealth into emerging technologies.

India for its part, must navigate a complex matrix of interests in West Asia. It seeks to deepen defence and technological cooperation with Israel along with fields of pharmaceuticals, technology and tourism, while simultaneously fostering democratic and economic engagement with Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf countries.

Moreover, India is working to maintain connectivity with Iran, especially concerning Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Development of the India-Middle East-Europe – Economic Corridor (IMEC) could significantly enhance regional connectivity and restructure strategic linkages between India's Gulf states, Israel and the broader Mediterranean region.

The UAE-based defence manufacturer, Caracal emerged as the winning bidder(by way of offering the lowest-cost deal) in a contract floated by the Indian Army to supply 93,895 close quarter battle carbines. This global tender was launched after both the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) failed to meet the Army’s expectations. However, the Caracal deal also fell through for multiple avoidable reasons, resulting in an overall soured experience. Nonetheless, Caracal has partnered with a local Indian firm to set up a small arms manufacturing unit in Hyderabad, keeping future opportunities in mind. ²¹

The potential for West Asia to emerge as a pivotal hub for global trade, finance, education, technology, defence and connectivity is substantial, by capitalizing on these regional transformations will require among other things, continuing to compel Pakistan, engage Afghanistan, transform ties with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Israel, invest in Oman, Jordan, Egypt, manage relations with turkey and Palestinian authority and mitigate fallout from Yemen and Syria.

Conclusion –

A proxy war is a specific type of conflict that is sometimes confused with coalition warfare, irregular warfare, or counterinsurgency. It is important to know that a proxy war is different from wars fought with alliances or groups working together. Instead, it has its unique features and relationships.

Importantly, a proxy war can happen in any environment in different types of situations and is not limited to one key environment.

The key factors that shape a proxy war include the abilities, goals and sensitivities of the parties involved. Additionally, the relationships in proxy wars are not the same for every situation, a stronger party does not simply tell a weaker one what to do and oversee everything.

The evolving nature of proxy warfare in West Asia is intensifying humanitarian crises, empowering non-state actors with advanced technologies and deepening great power competition. The resultant ripple effects ranging from disrupted energy markets to cyber threats highlight the urgent need for multilateral cooperation in the region.

Nevertheless, the strategic advantages for major powers, combined with the region’s entrenched rivalries, suggest that proxy conflicts are likely to continue as a low- risk high-reward method of statecraft. Key players, both regional and international, wield significant influence over stability and the region’s future, often through diplomatic manoeuvres, economic engagement and military interventions.

The interplay between regional rivalries, sectarian division and external influences has resulted in persistent conflicts, fragile governance structures and economic volatility. Despite ongoing efforts to foster cooperation and integration, challenges such as ideological extremism, unresolved territorial disputes and socio-political unrest hinder sustainable development.

However recent trends suggest an increasing emphasis on economic diversification, technological advancements and regional partnerships as potential pathways towards stability and growth.

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