Abstract

The 21st century witnessed the ‘globalisation’ of the environment, which laid the foundation of global environmental governance and contested climate debates worldwide. However, the dominant ‘global environment’ discourses disseminated through Western scientific and economic tools and narratives are political constructs rooted in the structural power asymmetries between the Global North and the South. They seek to universalise ecological responsibilities, mask historical injustices and perpetuate exploitative capitalist strategies.

Therefore, drawing on the concept of “climate imperialism” through Marx’s metabolic rift theory, the paper uncovers how the historical “weaponisation” of environmental narratives gets reproduced or challenged today through forums like the UNFCCC, the WTO, or in bilateral technology transfer negotiations. The paper argues that it is a direct assault on the principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) and affects India’s food and energy security and strategic autonomy. Furthermore, the paper explores strategies that India could adopt to tackle these challenges. Therefore, by centring India, this paper calls for the decolonisation of environmental governance by reconstructing more inclusive and spatially sensitive ecological policies.

Keywords: climate imperialism, global environment, Global South, India, CBDR
 

Introduction

By the dawn of the 20th century, the idea of ‘environment in danger’ dominated global discussions. While 19th-century scientists articulated the concept of ‘anthropocene’, its urgency became evident after the 1960s environmental awakening, the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the 1988 greenhouse summer, and 9/11 in 2001. These events facilitated the transnational circulation of ecological anxiety, which Northern-dominated narratives, technologies, and multilateral frameworks manipulate to bypass the principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR-RC), pressuring Southern countries to adopt obligations disproportionate to their historical emissions. This paper examines how these pressures threaten the food and energy security and strategic autonomy of India (Hulme, 2009).

Theoretical Framework

1. ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ Principle

Enshrined in Article 3 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), the ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) principle promotes climate justice by equitably distributing climate responsibilities between different states depending on their historical emissions. It recognises the Global South’s special needs and vulnerabilities and demands that the industrialised North lead climate combat (United Nations, 1992).

2. ‘Climate Imperialism’ Concept

Das et al (2022) argued that the capitalist core countries’ imperialism of poor Southern countries is unfolding in the realm of the environment through deceiving international climate negotiations, increasing carbon emissions through imperialist lifestyles, failure to finance mitigation strategies, privatising knowledge production, and perpetuating new forms of natural resource grabbing in developing countries.

3. Metabolic Rift Theory

Karl Marx’s ‘metabolic rift theory’ underscores how capitalist agriculture transported soil nutrients from the countryside to urban areas, which created a rift in the human-nature metabolism. Moreover, the inherent capital accumulation was based on the dual appropriation of nature and labour. By considering only the labour factor in the costs of production, capitalists ensured the constant manipulation of the “free gifts of nature”  (Foster, 2015).
 

Research Methodology

Deploying a qualitative case study approach, the paper analyses diverse secondary sources such as academic scholarship, policy documents and media reports. The following are the research questions:

1. How does the Global North reinforce and the South deconstruct neo-colonial environmental power dynamics through scientific and economic tools (genetically-modified Crops and the EU’s CBAM), global environmental initiatives through forums like the UNFCCC, the WTO, and lateral technology transfer negotiations?
2. What measures can India incorporate to better navigate these challenges in future?
    

Review of Literature

Grevsmühl (2016) explains how the USA used the 1972 ‘Blue Marble’ image of Earth as a small and fragile entity to ignite global humanity and demand equal responsibilities in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from all countries. This underscores how the North manufactures realities in visual weapons of global environmental imagery to overshadow Southern local narratives and achieve political motives.

However, the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), one of India’s most renowned environmental organisations, attacked this Western ‘global’ narrative by dispersing an image of a dying African child, highlighting the otherwise blurred national complex realities. It claimed that the agrarian South depends on the environment for livelihood and cannot prioritise greenhouse gas reduction at the same level. This underlines how countries like India strategically deploy the same tool to assert their agency and challenge the North’s authority in global environmental governance (Hulme, 2010 & Jasanoff, 2004).
Parallely, Moore (2015) highlighted how the North revived colonial capital accumulation by introducing the Green Revolution of high-yield hybrid seeds and chemical fertilisers in the South. The dreams of high productivity culminated in ‘Petro-farming’ and the seizure of Southern farmers’ autonomy as the farmers were now compelled to buy seed in every plantation season, fuelling the vicious cycle of class differentiation and food dependency. With the late 2000s cheap energy decline, the North came with the Gene Revolution. The herbicide-tolerant GM crops soon gave birth to “Superweeds,” replacing the surplus value with a negative value, which required further toxification, coming at elevated environmental costs. These agricultural revolutions of the North came at a huge cost for the South, widening the historical inequalities between the two worlds.

By locating these developments in the Indian context through the following four case studies, the paper examines the specifics of their effect and aims to contribute to the larger debates around strengthening the CBDR-RC principle to maintain climate justice and equity across the globe.

1. Patented Genetically Modified (GM) Crops: Food Security and Seed Sovereignty in Danger

Northern countries like the USA project GM crops as a fast-paced solution to poverty and climate change. Since 1996, 24 Southern countries have opened their doors to GM cotton, soybeans and maize. India allowed American company Monsanto to deliver Bt Cotton, a GM crop that promised to reduce pesticide dependence, labour costs and crop losses by controlling bollworm pests and increasing yields, in a joint venture with Indian seed firm Mahyo in 2002. In the following twenty years, it covered 50% cotton production areas in India (Karamchedu, 2022).

By 2013, Bt Cotton led to increased annual yield by 77.6 kg/ha, increased fertiliser use up to 200-210 kg/ha, while insecticide costs decreased significantly to below Rs. 1500/ha. However, from 2013 to 2022, yield dropped by 30.44 kg/ha per year due to extreme rainfall, underlining the misalignment between complex ground realities like local climate conditions and the promise of linear growth. The stagnant productivity and heightened resistance of pink bollworm to Bt variety posed urgent policy concerns about the long-term impacts of Bt Cotton in India  (Reddy & Prasad, 2025).

Moreover, the high price of patented Bt Cotton also played a significant role in drastically poor yields and ecological degradation that disproportionately pushed many Indian farmers into debt and suicide. Since 2008, Monsanto has held the sole patent ownership for Bt cotton seeds until Indian seed companies like Nuziveedu gained the right to use Monsanto technology under sub-license agreements in 2015. However, both countries entered the Delhi High Court after Monsanto terminated the contract, demanding a higher fee. Nonetheless, the court denied Monsanto’s monopoly over patent rights, arguing that section 3(j) of the Indian Patents Act aligns with Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property rights (TRIPS) of the WTO (Chawla, 2018; Gutierrez et al., 2023; Karamchedu, 2022).

This case probvides us with four important insights the Bt Cotton case provided us with: developed countries extract unjust profit through Patented GM crop imports to the South; the mismatch between local and foreign climates and inherent problems in gene modification technologies could exacerbate India’s environmental degradation, crop losses and farmers’ socio-economic burdens; the increasing dependency on GM crops directly impacts India’s food security and seed sovereignty by jeopardising Indian indigenous seed usage knowledge; and lastly, India strategically use international regulations like TRIPS of WTO to challenge Western patent monopoly. This highlights the entanglement between the North’s reproduction of neocolonial tendencies and the South’s refusal to surrender.

Nevertheless, after 23 years, the USA has been pressuring India again to import US-based GM corn, soy and milk. While India has taken a strong stance to reject these requests for months, recent intelligence suggests that the country is now considering importing GM corn as a geopolitical bargain for ethanol production and countering punitive secondary tariffs imposed by the US for India’s purchase of Russian oil (Rai, 2025; Suneja & Sikarwar, 2025).

However, According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry and business reports, India is self-sufficient in corn and dairy production. Moreover, India’s acquisition of a 20% Ethanol mix in petrol proves that India doesn’t really need US corn to produce ethanol.  Therefore, Trump’s pressure on India to import these GM crops poses a significant challenge to Indian farmers by reducing market prices. Provided that a large segment of Indian farmers are marginal, according to the 2015-16 Agriculture Census, these imports will jeopardise farmers' livelihoods and subsistence. This underlines how the GM crop import impositions not only hamper India’s food security but also threaten its strategic autonomy. While no official announcements have been released yet, we believe India will hold its strategic autonomy at the centre of future delegations over GM crop  (Mohanty, 2025).

2. Methane Pledge at COP26 and NCQG at COP29: Assaults on CBDR-RC

Twelve developed countries took the Global Methane Pledge to reduce deforestation and methane gas emissions by 30% by 2030 at COP26 in Glasgow. These countries made promises to transfer $12 billion in public funding to developing countries before 2025 for degraded land restoration and wildfire management, with a minimum $7.2 billion contributed by the private sector. Western ecological policy impositions of this kind, through forums like UNFCCC, explicitly highlight their assault on the CBDR-RC principle by subjugating developing and underdeveloped countries’ special needs and vulnerabilities (Spring & Mason, 2021).

However, India led the Global South in its refusal to take the pledge, citing its misalignment with the country’s developmental needs. Around 15% Indian economy depends on agriculture and provides livelihood to more than 1.3 billion people. Officials argued that prioritising the methane pledge would jeopardise the Indian village economy and domestic agricultural and animal husbandry industries. Once again, India has asserted its strategic autonomy and denied succumbing to global pressures (Arora & Bhardwaj, 2021).

Likewise, India rejected the hastily crafted New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) proposed by the industrialised West at COP29 in Baku. NCQG promises to provide a minimum annual amount of $300 billion by 2035 to developing nations in combating the issue of climate change after failing to meet the earlier annual target of $100 billion on time, which was delayed by two years in 2022. India called out to the rush in framing it without considering opinions from the South (Srivastava, 2024).

Moreover, Indian delegates criticised the inability of meeting environmental goals with such a small amount by labelling it an “optical illusion” and raised a Southern voice in raising it to $600 billion a year. Noticeably, India opposed Northern proposals to include China and the Gulf states under the ambit of donor nations, as this could set a precedent that might be deployed against other developing nations as well. This is a strategic and future-centred defence of Global South solidarity to protect the integrity of the CBDR principle for all developing countries (Mohan, 2024; Srivastava, 2024).

Moreover, India, on behalf of   Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), raised the demand that developed countries must accommodate at least $1.3 trillion till 2030 through grants as concessional financial support that would allow developing countries to mitigate negative environmental consequences without falling into debt. This highlights India’s role not just as a resistor to Northern dominance but as a proactive leader of the Global South (Press Information Bureau Delhi, 2024).

Nevertheless, this budget demonstrates how industrialised countries attempt to limit the CBDR-RC principle in practice, making the South suffer, despite being more vulnerable to ecological calamities due to their comparatively lower emissions. It also highlights how Southern countries, such as India, exercise their agency at international platforms. Policy actions like these reproduce the rift that Marx warned us against, but now in the context of environmental protection and power manipulation.

3. EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Economic Tools of Climate Imperialism over Energy Security

Following its “Fit for 55” objective of reducing 55% greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, the EU introduced CBAM in its transitional phase in 2023. CBAM aims to impose tax on carbon-intensive goods seeking entry inside the EU borders to promote clean industrial production in non-EU states and achieve domestic growth, reduced carbon leakage and decarbonisation in EU industries. However, Indian industry experts have expressed concerns over developed countries making CBAM or similar tax mechanisms the new norm as the UK prepares to launch its CBAM in 2027, threatening developing countries' export growth (European Commission, n.d.; FICCI, 2025; Grover & Ranjan, 2025).

The Global Trade Research Institute’s report demonstrated a sharp decline of 24.4% in India’s combined steel and aluminium exports to the EU from $7.71 billion in FY2024 to $5.82 billion in FY2025 since CBAM’s mandatory reporting began. Moreover, while the domestic carbon price is expected to be under $10/tonne, the EU’s carbon price spikes up to around $71/tonne. The stark carbon price differential imposes the burden to bear this extra cost on Indian exporters, potentially undermining India’s competitive trade advantage (TOI Business Desk, 2025).

Indian officials at the 2023 G20 summit challenged the North’s potential manipulation of unilateral economic tools and trade barriers, such as CBAM, under the guise of leading the South to low-carbon pathways, with India's Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal threatening retaliatory measures. Facing Indian retaliation, European Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra at a UN climate press conference explained, “CBAM's sole aim is to prevent carbon leakage.” This is the carefully crafted moral packaging of power-hungry measures taken to revitalise the chains of environmental exploitation of the South (Deccan Herald, 2023; Mohan, 2024).

However, when Peter Liese, a German politician and a European Parliament member, stated, “Any agenda to destroy CBAM will destroy much more than that,” the subtlety of Northern intentions withered away.  Liese’s statement underlines the tone of threat, a historical instrument of imperialism, which is now overflowing in the ecological realm as climate imperialism perpetuates in global environmental governance (Deccan Herald, 2023).

With the clock ticking for its definite implementation on January 1, 2026, the imposition of additional costs will directly hamper developing countries like India, whose major EU exports come from high-energy-consuming industries. Due to the constrained availability of cleaner technologies involved in CBAM, Indian sectors like aluminium, steel, automobiles, fertilisers, polymers, and cement rely on fossil fuels for their high energy needs. Technology constraints and limited resources also create challenges in implementing CBAM’s monitoring, reporting and verification requirements in India.  Non-mining industries and larger enterprises are more at risk, with steel being the most vulnerable, facing $102-119 duties. These signs point to a potential reduction in India’s competitive advantage and trade with the EU (FICCI, 2025; Grover & Ranjan, 2025).

Indeed, by implementing so-called cleaner technologies with moral objectives of saving the planet, the developed North neglects the variations in technological availability, development levels and nuances of energy sectors between the North and the South. While the North exert a monopoly over green technologies, the Indian energy sector still relies on fossil fuels and will face a major blow due to the 20-35?rbon tax levied by the EU. CBAM, thus, looks more like the EU’s economic tool of climate imperialism that would externalise the environmental and economic costs of North’s “green transition” and the burden of emission reduction to developing countries like India, moulding the historical metabolic rift into the veins of geopolitical power hierarchies that jeopardise the CBDR principle preserved in UNFCCC.

4. Indo-German Green Hydrogen Roadmap: Double-Edged Sword of Opportunity and Challenges

India’s 2023 National Green Hydrogen Mission, aimed at fostering “Aatmanirbhar” energy production by 2027, following its “Panchamrit” action plan articulated at COP-26, showed the country’s dedication towards sustainable development. In 2022, it signed the Indo-German Green Hydrogen Task Force (GHTF) and Indo-German Green Hydrogen Roadmap in 2024 to bolster bilateral energy cooperation with Germany. The Roadmap, facilitated by the Indo-German Energy Forum (IGEF), includes heavy private sector investment with India’s Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition (SIGHT) programme’s support, formulation of a national Indian methodology for measurement, reporting and verification of green hydrogen production, joint Research and Development (R&D) in storage, transportation and application technologies, and the creation of production hubs, terminals and shipping corridors to transport large-scale green ammonia to Germany (Mann, 2025; The Indo-German Energy Forum, n.d.).

While this Roadmap is a strong boost to India’s green hydrogen mission, it poses significant challenges and uncovers hidden power asymmetries. The need for Indian companies to meet the German standards for receiving German electrolyte production subsidies and align Indian exports with the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED II)’s sustainability criteria to receive certification and entry in the EU markets unveils how Northern standards are again being imposed on India, already worsened by trade barriers like the CBAM.  (The Indo-German Energy Forum, n.d.).

These nuances of standards and technological differences embedded in bilateral technology transfer negotiations force India to formulate a legal framework governing Green Hydrogen that aligns with the EU standard and incur heavy technology, production, storage and transportation costs due to restricted infrastructure and technological and economic considerations. Moreover, the non-legally binding nature and permission to end it anytime with just a 3-month prior written notice impose no strict obligations on either party, leaving the bilateral collaboration vulnerable to shifting geopolitical tensions and long-term failures. (Mann, 2025; The Indo-German Energy Forum, n.d.).

This uncovers how bilateral technology transfer negotiations act as double-edged swords. On the one hand, they open avenues for sustainable energy production, knowledge exchange, investment and skill development. On the other hand, it risks subordinating India’s energy future to Northern frameworks and certification standards, invoking questions about India’s strategic autonomy, fairness under CBDR, and harmony between domestic energy security and export-centred hydrogen production and trade.

Therefore, following its multi-alignment principle, India is strategically diversifying its bilateral partners by opening its clean energy markets to British green-tech companies. This year, India signed the UK-India Vision 2035 framework to boost bilateral trade and establish frameworks for receiving British green technologies and joint research in sustainable energy solutions. This highlights how India is exercising its agency by establishing multiple bilateral cooperation mechanisms to address both the lack of international technology transfer and asymmetries, as well as overdependence in bilateral transfers (Darley, 2025).
 

Policy Suggestions: The Way Ahead for India

To negotiate better with the complexities presented by these four case studies, India should adopt a two-fold policy approach, one aimed at the global level and the other at the domestic level.

1.  Global Legal and Normative Reinforcement: Upholding the CBDR principle

India must continue leveraging global legal and political platforms like the WTO’s TRIPS and COP meetings to challenge Northern exploitation of the CBDR principle that stands as the backbone of India’s climate diplomacy at the global level. Simultaneously, India should accelerate its South-South solidarity programme to gain Southern alliances to obstruct unjust policies like the NCGQ more firmly and reincorporate accountability and justice in environmental governance. Establishing India-led regional Southern certification standards and regulations would further counter the monopolistic imposition of Northern frameworks. Lastly, reinforcing the CBDR principle at every occasion it faces a threat must be at the centre of India’s environmental negotiation stage.

2. Domestic Resilience and Innovation: Reiterating Strategic Autonomy

Long-term strategic autonomy stems from strengthening domestic capacity. Therefore, India must increase investment in national R&D to create low-cost electrolytes, less carbon-intensive industrial processes and other local green technologies. Advancing inclusive governance, India must integrate local knowledge, farmer communities, scientists, and non-state actors in promoting natural seed-reuse practices to protect its seed sovereignty and prevent predatory GM-crop trade regimes. Lastly, building regionally tailored, context-specific and adaptive policies and regulatory frameworks for building green hydrogen infrastructure and rising renewable energy must be complemented with a flexible IPR apparatus that balances the protection of local knowledge from Northern appropriation and local industries from expensive Northern patent monopolies.

By reiterating its domestic resilience and innovation, India can preserve its food and energy security, reduce dependency on the North and reconstruct local policy frameworks that cater to its socio-economic diversities. By adopting these measures, India can mould external pressures into national opportunities for a just climate diplomacy, capacity-building, and leadership in the Global South. It could lead the South by emerging as a model of operationalising the CBDR principle while reasserting its strategic autonomy.
 

Conclusion

From the colonial era to the present, the North has been the champion of “climate imperialism,” crafting neo-patterns to exploit the South. The four case studies demonstrated how the Northern-manipulated environmental narratives and frameworks exert unilateral influence over Southern climate actions and could potentially sabotage India’s food and energy security and strategic autonomy. Yet, by asserting regulatory checks on Bt Cotton patents through TRIPS, rejecting the Methane Pledge and NCQG and diversifying its trade and technology avenues, India has challenged the Northern regime of unjust patents, scientific and economic instruments, and violation of the CBDR principle. Leveraging global platforms, building Southern solidarity, crafting national and regional standards, accelerating domestic innovation, inclusive governance, balancing the complexity of IPR, and most importantly, reasserting the CBRD principle, India can streamline its global climate diplomacy and national autonomy.

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