What happened yesterday in Bangladesh did not surprise me. In fact, I have been warning about this possibility for some time. But what has surprised me is that this did not happen earlier! Let me share my thoughts about the events in Bangladesh and the wider implications of what has happened with you. I do not expect everyone to agree with my assessment. But even when you disagree, if you respond to my comments, please keep the tone and language civil.

First, what has just happened is an organized coup against the Awami League Government led by Sheikh Hasina orchestrated by several players both internal and external. Sure, it started with student protests, against government job quotas. But the movement was soon taken over by hardcore Islamists notably from the Jamaat-e-Islami and rabble rousers of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), with tacit backing from the Biden Administration. The street protests that eventually led to Hasina's ouster were eerily reminiscent of the street protests in Kiev/Ukraine in 2014 (the so-called Orange Revolution) orchestrated by the US State Department and the CIA that led to the ouster of a democratically elected president. So, make no mistake, this was a coup carried out jointly by Bangladeshi Islamists and the military (the BNP after all is a party of the military) with support from the United States.

Second, Hasina did herself and her government no favours by failing to stem these riots. Her failure appears to me to be more of a political failure, meaning her inability or unwillingness to reach out to the opposition. Had she agreed to hold national elections under a caretaker government and impartial international observers, as demanded by the opposition, such drastic developments perhaps could have been avoided. Her stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise in the face of opposition criticism made her appear more dictatorial in style and substance. Over time, her stance and attitude alienated large sections of the Bangladeshi civil society, which was instrumental behind her downfall.

Third, this was never about job quotas. The Hasina Government had agreed to do away with job quotas. But the quotas were reimposed due to a High Court decision after beneficiaries challenged the government order. That High Court decision was then challenged in the Supreme Court, which expedited the hearings and did away with quotas except for a meagre 5%. But the damage had been done, particularly after some caustic comments that the PM made about job quotas, muktijodhyas (freedom fighters), and razakars (collaborators with the Pakistani military during the genocide of Bengalis in East Pakistan in 1971)!

Fourth, it is undoubtedly true that Bangladesh made rapid progress in development under Hasina. But it is also true that in a post-pandemic environment, Bangladesh was facing high unemployment, inflation, and a sense of economic drift. This is not unique to Bangladesh. Many countries in South Asia and elsewhere are facing such scenarios. So, to use this as an explanation for street protests would be a mistake in my opinion. Instead, a more alarming development that has taken place in Bangladesh over the past twenty odd years has been the massive radicalization of the population, particularly the youth belonging to both lower and middle classes. This development is not unique to Bangladesh. In South Asia, widespread radicalization has taken place amongst Muslim populations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Many commentators and experts have highlighted this phenomenon, but the states have either been complicit or ignorant or indecisive in the face of this rapid Islamist radicalization of the population. In Bangladesh’s case, Hasina’s government took half-hearted measures to deal with this situation. They arrested and hanged some notable collaborators from the 1971 war of independence, but basically did little to stop the rampant radicalization that was happening in Islamic madrassas all over the country. Moreover, Bangladesh’s university campuses had become highly radicalized, which the government did little to stop and reverse. In a nutshell, the biggest failure of Hasina in my opinion has been her failure to prevent the transformation of Bangladesh from a liberal-secular country to a radicalized-Islamist nation today. What is worse is that for political reasons, she even facilitated that process by turning a blind eye to what was taking place in wider society right under her nose. When she finally banned the Jamaat-e-Islami, it was like shutting the barn door after the horse has bolted!

Fifth, the Bangladesh military has certainly seized the moment to make itself politically relevant again and to play the role of kingmaker in Bangladeshi politics. Let’s face it, there was never any love between the military and the Awami League, particularly after its iconic leader, founder of Bangladesh, and father of Sheikh Hasina, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was brutally assassinated by the military along with most of his family in 1975. Although Hasina has appointed many top military generals during her long reign, the relationship between her party and the military has never been cordial or easy. The military on its part founded the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), with which it continues to have good ties. Immediately upon Hasina’s ouster, the military has created a provisional government with several ex-generals as prominent members; one of the first acts of this provisional government has been to order the release of Begum Khalida Zia (wife of former General Ziaur Rehman, who had ordered the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975 and founded the BNP in 1978) who has been in prison on graft charges. As a political party, the BNP has been very close to the Jamaat-e-Islami, with which it shared power earlier. It will not surprise me one bit if the military now orchestrates the creation of a BNP-Jamaat government in Bangladesh. In any case, Bangladesh will certainly move away from the Awami League brand of politics and political ideology going forward; yesterday, violent mobs were seen tearing down statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the founder of Bangladesh, across the country with little effort by the military to stop them!

Sixth, the condition of non-Muslim minorities, particularly Hindus and Buddhists, in Bangladesh are certain to worsen. Already, gruesome images and videos of targeted violence by radical Islamists against Hindus in Bangladesh are circulating on social media platforms like X. These attacks are likely to increase in the future. The leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in West Bengal, India, Subhendu Adhikari, warned yesterday that ten million persecuted Hindus from Bangladesh could seek shelter in neighbouring Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura over the coming weeks and months. While Adhikari’s warning could be dismissed as hyperbole, the fact remains that Hindu families and their places of worship have been subjected to targeted violence by radical Islamists in Bangladesh. If these attacks grow in intensity, many Hindu families will be forced to flee to India. In the Buddhist tribal hill tracts of southeastern Bangladesh, land grabs by Islamist forces have been going on for some time, particularly since the arrival of over a million Rohingya refugees from neighbouring Myanmar. These activities are further likely to intensify in Bangladesh in the future.

Seventh, in my judgement, this Islamist-military coup in Bangladesh perhaps has been facilitated and tacitly supported by the United States. To understand the US role in Bangladesh, one needs to understand US foreign policy strategy and how South Asia fits in within that strategy. Today, the United States is involved in a serious hegemonic “war” with two major strategic rivals: China in Asia, and Russia in Europe. For the US, keeping China and Russia down is vital to maintain its global hegemonic dominance, a position it has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War in the early-1990s. But for China and Russia, it is also vitally important to challenge America’s hegemony, particularly in Asia (China) and Europe (Russia), to reconstruct a multipolar global order. As events over the past few decades show, America has tried to strategically ringfence China and Russia by expanding NATO, building more military bases, strengthening regional military alliances, forward deploying military assets, and constructing more robust ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities. This is where the game gets interesting with regards to Bangladesh. America has tried but failed to convince India to join a US-led military alliance against China. American scholars and practitioners have argued that such an alliance will be beneficial to India in the event a war breaks out with China over the disputed Sino-Indian border. The Biden Administration even tried to convince the Modi government to agree to make India a NATO-partner in Asia (like South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) but with no luck. The Americans have also become frustrated with India’s stance within the QUAD (New Delhi has consistently argued that the QUAD is not a military alliance against China). India’s refusal to criticise Russia over Ukraine has further angered the Americans. In a nutshell, failing to convince India under Modi to become a strategic ally, America turned its attention to Bangladesh. There were reports earlier that the American ambassador in Dhaka wanted certain military concessions from the Hasina government (basically for American fighter jets to use Bangladesh’s air bases and for the setting up of ISR and spying facilities targeting Myanmar and China), which the Bangladesh government turned down perhaps on the advice of India. This then set into motion a collision course between Hasina and the Biden Administration. America threatened that it would deny visas to Hasina and her people if the national elections are not held in a free and fair manner. Washington also was not pleased by the massive support that Modi provided Hasina, which many in the Biden Administration believed had made Hasina arrogant. The fact that the Hasina government was negotiating with China for a contract to develop and manage the Teesta River basin in northern Bangladesh also perhaps alarmed the US. Therefore, the post-election coup to oust Hasina, which could bring in a more US-friendly and anti-India and anti-China regime to power, may have had tacit support and backing from the United States. If my assessment proves to be accurate, then in the future we are likely to see a bigger American strategic presence and role in Bangladesh.

Eighth, for China, Hasina’s ouster and the prospect of a BNP-Jamaat government backed by the United States, will be a cause for concern. American strategic presence in Bangladesh, if it were to happen, will certainly add to Chinese worries in its southern flank. Beijing certainly did not like the recent visit of Nancy Pelosi and others to India to meet with the Dalai Lama. Could this signal a US-supported revival or stoking of a Tibetan separatist insurgency against Beijing? American military access to and covert operations based out of Bangladesh will also worry Beijing. For instance, it is no secret that America wants regime change in Myanmar and may even support (or engineer) Myanmar’s breakup. This may allow the United States to install a pro-US regime in power or even gain a strategic foothold in northern Myanmar along China’s southern border. As I have said earlier, America is involved in a hegemonic war with China. Therefore, it may make a lot of sense for America to ringfence China strategically not only in the East (Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia), but also in the South (Bangladesh, Myanmar, possibly Nepal), and the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asian states). Military planners in Beijing will be certainly thinking along these lines!
 

Ninth, is the ouster of Hasina a political victory for Pakistan, particularly the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s premier military spy agency? It has been an open secret for some time that the ISI has developed deep roots inside Bangladesh, particularly with the Jamaat-e-Islami and other radical Islamist groups. Heavy funding from Pakistan and other sources have been regularly funnelled into the coffers of the Jamaat and other organizations by the networks maintained by the ISI in Bangladesh, but also in India, Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. In southeastern Bangladesh, particularly in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar and Chittagong, the ISI has been very active in recruiting jihadis for terror operations in Bangladesh, India, and other places. ISI activities are certainly going to increase in Bangladesh if a new BNP-Jamaat regime eventually take over.
 

Finally, the ouster of the Hasina regime and the prospect of a BNP-Jamaat government in Bangladesh is real bad news for India and Modi. The impact on India requires a detailed separate analysis, which I will do in due course. Here, I will make a few quick observations. If you look at South Asia (a region comprising of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), India does not have too many friends. Afghanistan is under the Taliban while Pakistan is India’s bitterest enemy. Nepal is now under K.P. Sharma Oli, a known India baiter. Same story in Maldives with the coming to power of Mohamed Muizzu, who fought the election under a “India Out” campaign. The Wickremasinghe regime in Sri Lanka is pro-India but there is no guarantee that he will win re-election. That leaves Bhutan and Bangladesh. Bhutan now has a government that is much more pro-India than the previous one. But Hasina was India’s best friend in South Asia. Modi’s personal equation with Hasina has been very warm and she personally attended Modi’s third swearing-in ceremony in Delhi in June 2024. It is with Hasina’s support that India has been able to bring down illegal infiltration from Bangladesh into Assam and the northeast. Bangladesh’s support has also been critical for Indian forces to get a grip on insurgent activities in the northeastern states particularly Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya. Some of these gains could be reversed in the coming months under a new Bangladeshi regime. At the time of Hasina’s ouster, the two governments were holding serious talks regarding the development and management of the Teesta River Basin in northern Bangladesh. The India-Bangladesh Teesta River water sharing agreement is also up for renewal. How the new Bangladeshi regime will approach these negotiations is hard to predict. But I will not be surprised if Bangladesh hardens its stance on these issues. The other immediate worrying factor for India will be the potential influx of Hindu refugees from Bangladesh. If these people are to be settled in India, this would require strong political leadership but may also lead to greater clashes between the Modi government and the opposition parties. Heightened activity of the ISI and infiltration of Islamist radicals from Bangladesh could also undermine the security of border regions and expose India to greater terrorist activities. Potential American covert activities in Myanmar through Bangladesh could also adversely affect the security of India’s long and difficult border with Myanmar and further aggravate the fraught political situation in states like Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland.

I welcome comments from readers. But as I have said earlier, please keep your tone and language civil.